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Abstract
Popular interpretations and academic scholarship tends to emphasize the relationship
between jihad, military action, and communal violence. These reinforce a sense that
violence is inherent to Islam. Investigations into the contexts where jihad has been
deployed highlight how its use is often a call for unity believed to be necessary for
political goals. Therefore, in order to deconstruct this belief, this thesis tackles instead the
relationship between textual interpretations and historical actions, and how these varied
across specific moments in time. The case studies examined range from the initial
evolution of a theory of jihad in the late antique world, to the Crusades in the 11th and
12th centuries, to early modern dynamics of the Ottomans and Safavids, and finally to
modern state-making projects in the Arabian Peninsula These examples seek to create a
comprehensive picture of the intricacies rooted in jihad and the narrative that can be
associated with a religion that is most often misunderstood. The effort to shed some light
on the multiple facets of jihad is hinged upon how these case studies differ from one
another, thus forcing the reader to question how they previously understood the modern
day phenomenon of jihad. While the conversation will reiterate various themes and
concepts as discussed in previous scholarship, it should push the boundaries on how jihad
has been framed as a modern day extremist ideology.
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Introduction

S

eptember 11th, 2001 will forever be known as an iconic day in history for
more than just the tragic events that took place in the United States of

America. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, US foreign policy was deconstructed
and revamped into an entirely new beast, focused upon an aggressive counter-attack that
would set a precedent against future threats. While this process was directed towards the
Middle East, Pakistan and Afghanistan, the entirety of the Muslim world was branded in
association with the attacks. The sense of fear that permeated societies accommodating
Muslims has been a common generalization in the post 9/11 world and resulted in
unjustified assumptions about what Islam teaches and its role in shaping Muslim
societies. At the core of these generalizations has been the use of the word jihad, which
arguably catapulted to prominence when Osama Bin Laden declared it as a framework of
action against the West. The context in which this word emerged in the 21st century and
dominated religious and political dialogue has led to accompanying connotations of
aggressiveness on the entire Muslim community. In light of these events, this thesis
investigates the history and evolution of jihad from the late antique world to the present
in order to better contextualize contemporary processes. There have been many efforts to
understand the history of the term, but this portrait of jihad remains as most do not
investigate the relationship between the Qur’an and distinct historical contexts and
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interpretations. While the essence of jihad is derived from the Qur’an, its consequent
manifestations represent the wildly different circumstances of where it has been evoked.
The journey of jihad has manifested itself in multiple forms, with the majority of
modern scholarship attempting to place recent events in a historical context in order to
reveal the various complexities inherent in the term. In Jihad in Islamic History:
Doctrines and Practices, Bonner looks at the Qur’an’s messages about how fighting and
jihad are inseparable from its requirements of generosity and care for the poor. Bonner
examines how “jihad is a complex set of doctrines and practices that have changed over
time and continue to evolve today.” 1 Thus, within his text, Bonner tries to dispel the
binary notion that jihad means only violence or only peace. Reuvan Firestone also
conducted his research within this sphere of academic scholarship, basing his hypothesis
on evidence from the Qur’an and early Islamic literary sources. Firestone locates the
origin of Islamic holy war “as a response to the changes affecting the new community of
Muslims in its transition from ancient Arabian culture to the religious civilization of
Islam.” 2 By approaching any understanding of jihad through the Qur’an, the reader is
exposed to the series of events that led to the formation of Islam. Therefore, jihad
automatically becomes situated in the broader context of the late antique period,
inextricably linked to the rise of monotheistic religions. Therefore, the opening chapter of
this thesis shall also dive into the events that gave birth to Islam in order to acknowledge
how notions of just and holy war were part of the inheritance of Islam. Furthermore, this
chapter will build upon examinations into this period of time to demonstrate the issues of

1

Bonner, Michael David. Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practice. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2006.
2
Firestone, Reuven. Jihād: The Origin of Holy War in Islam. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
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interpretation that result from the events of the Prophet Muhammad’s life and the
creation of the Qur’an. As a result, this process leads to the intersection between divine
word and historical contingency within the context of the Arabian Peninsula. This
contingency becomes the framework for investigating particular historical moments in
the rest of the thesis.
The need for a framework is crucial in determining the role of jihad as applied to
different contexts. This framework becomes extremely relevant especially as scholarship
tends to promote the link between holy war and jihad, particularly highlighted in the
Crusades. In Crusading and the Crusader States, Andrew Jotischky explains how the
idea of holy wars came into being and why they took the form that they did - a clash
between western and Islamic societies that dominated the Middle Ages. 3 John Kelsay and
James Johnson highlight the particular questions that connect with the phenomenon of
holy war through the lens of jihad via both literary and historical sources on war and
peace, and explore the relationship between western and Islamic societies. 4
Furthermore, the influence of the Crusades on contemporary interpretations of
jihad often derive from the success of Salah al-Din, and how he was portrayed as using
jihad as a uniting factor for Sunni Islam, as well as how he embodied and advocated for it
in all aspects of his life. 56 Salah al-Din’s life was further illuminated through the
translation of previously unpublished material supporting the inextricable link between

3

Jotischky, Andrew. Crusading and the Crusader States. Harlow, England: Pearson/Longman, 2004.
Kelsay, John, and James Johnson. Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War
and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions. New York: Greenwood Press, 1991.
5
Bartlett, W. B. Islam's War Against the Crusaders. Stroud: History Press, 2008.
6
Hring, Hannes. Saladin, the Sultan and His Times, 1138-1193. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 2008.
4
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jihad and his philosophies. 7 This concept has become especially important in widely
circulated popular histories. In the The Shade of Swords, MJ Akbar further explains how
jihad thrives on “complex and shifting notions of persecution, victory and sacrifice, and
illustrating how Muslims themselves have historically tried to direct and control the
phenomenon of Jihad.” 8 This concept was also incorporated in Peter Partner’s book God
of Battles: Holy Wars of Christianity and Islam who works towards informing his readers
about allowing crusading war propaganda fuelling our judgments today. The influential
nature of the Crusades in shaping modern interpretations of jihad prompted the basis of
the second chapter in this thesis. In acknowledging the importance of the Crusades and of
Salah al-Din’s leadership, the foundations of the chapter will demonstrate how the
fragmentation of the Sunni Muslim identity provided an opportunity for the resurgence of
jihad. Yet, this chapter will demonstrate that the role of Salah al-Din and his predecessors
is only significant insomuch that the chroniclers of the time presented him as the vehicle
that embraced jihad in order to unite Sunni Islam. Therefore, the importance of the
relationship between Salah al-Din and religious entities is necessary as it defined an era
where aggressively asserting religious principles through justified military actions was
necessary for the survival of Islam.
The connection between religious and political entities in applying jihad to a
particular context relates to the greater dynamic of legitimizing war and conquest, in the
name of religion, in order to attain a specific goal. As a result, a large amount of
scholarship has been devoted to the notion of jihad and its use in legitimizing war. Nazih
7

Lyons, M. C., and D. E. P. Jackson. Saladin: The Politics of the Holy War. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1982.
8
Akbar, M. J. The Shade of Swords Jihad and the Conflict between Islam and Christianity. London:
Routledge, 2002.
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Ayubi examines the claim of those Islamists who contend that, as a belief system and a
way of life, Islam carries with it a theory of politics and the state which should be applied
unquestioningly. 9 Thus, the historical connection between Islam and politics can be
explained as an attempt by rulers to legitimize their actions. Through such scholarship,
jihad has often been understood as a category of its own when analyzing different types
of wars. Yet, the role that jihad has played in developing the relationship between
religion and politics provides a new theoretical understanding of Islam with an emphasis
on the authority of those who could demand it. 10 Consequently, the third chapter of this
thesis will look at the restructuring of religious authority in the Ottoman Empire, in order
to unite religious and political goals, which could be achieved through jihad.
Subsequently, this chapter will also recognize that these actions were employed in an
attempt to control and regulate such vast areas of land. Furthermore, this chapter will
highlight how the Ottomans through this new order, justified holy war sentiment
particularly towards their Shi’i Muslim neighbors, the Safavids. The shift in Ottoman
mentality that allowed aggressive actions towards other Muslim entities highlights a
departure from many implementations of jihad due to the overarching goals of the
Empire.
The varying degrees of scholarship surrounding jihad tend to lean towards
religious and political relationships, especially as Islam moves past the Ottoman era.
Research surrounding the politicization of jihad and how it impacted political and
military structures of different empires takes precedence in the eras of imperialist and the

9

Ayubi, Nazih N. M. Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World. London: Routledge, 1991
Baer, Marc David. Honored by the Glory of Islam Conversion and Conquest in Ottoman Empire. New
York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
10
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rise of the nation-state. 11 David Cook focusses on the practical and theoretical meanings
of jihad, citing from scriptural, legal and newly translated texts to give readers a taste of
the often ambiguous information that is used to construct Islamic political doctrine in the
modern period. 12 Thus, the final chapter of this thesis will draw upon the impact of the
relationship between Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and Muhammad ibn Saud in
demonstrating how orthodox interpretations of jihad also impact religious and political
dynamics in state formation. The context that gave birth to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
which was later emphasized in the early 20th century by Abdulaziz ibn Muhammad al
Saud, the nation’s founder, reflects upon the significance political patronage carried in
accessing power. As a result, looking at the relationship between ibn Saud and the
Ikhwan, a Wahhabi religious militia, reveal how both political and religious entities
benefitted through such an alliance. Yet, this chapter also examines how unrestrained
religious zeal was not to be tolerated, and consequently, institutionalizing Wahhabism
and reigning in the excess of aggressive actions that were delivered under the umbrella of
jihad, by the Ikhwan, served ibn Saud’s goals of achieving political stability and
consolidating his power. At this juncture, the final chapter displays how powerful
religious groups were only tolerated insofar as they did not pose a greater threat to those
establishing political and territorial power.
Popular interpretations and academic scholarship tends to emphasize the
relationship between jihad, military action, and communal violence. These reinforce a
sense that violence is inherent to Islam. Investigations into the contexts where jihad has

11

Dale, Stephen Frederic. The Muslim Empires of the Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2010.
12
Cook, David. Understanding Jihad. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005.
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been deployed highlight how its use is often a call for unity believed to be necessary for
political goals. This thesis tackles instead the relationship between textural interpretations
and historical actions, and how these varied across specific moments in time. The case
studies examined range from the initial evolution of a theory of jihad in the late antique
world, to the Crusades in the 11th and 12th centuries, to early modern dynamics of the
Ottomans and Safavids, and finally to modern state-making projects in the Arabian
Peninsula These examples seek to create a comprehensive picture of the intricacies rooted
in jihad and the narrative that can be associated with a religion that is most often
misunderstood. The effort to shed some light on the multiple facets of jihad is hinged
upon how these case studies differ from one another, thus forcing the reader to question
how they previously understood the modern day phenomenon of jihad. While the
conversation will reiterate various themes and concepts as discussed in previous
scholarship, it should push the boundaries on how jihad has been framed as a modern day
extremist ideology.
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I
Demystifying the Origins of Jihad: The Emergence of Religiously
Justified Warfare in the Late Antique World & Islam’s Inheritance

I

n the post 9/11 world, Islam is often associated with, or directly accused of
being, an inherently violent religion. Proponents of such an argument assert

this point through a singular definition of jihad that brings Muslim groups into conflict
with anyone unlike themselves. As terrorist groups, rooted in certain ideological
interpretations of Islam, continue to wage war on innocent civilians, jihad continues to be
used as a loaded weapon to perpetuate Islamophobic molds. Therefore, this thesis aims to
undermine and dispel such molds by analyzing the way in which jihad, as an orientation
and an action, evolved across distinct historical periods.
Developing a framework for such an historical investigation is paramount to
understanding how varying interpretations of the concept have appeared in particular
contexts. Yet, designing this framework is inherently problematic, as this interpretative
structure must also explore the ways in which Muslim leaders generated arguments for
the appropriate political, religious, and moral use of jihad. Thus, acknowledging that
these contexts each generated their own interpretation of jihad, influenced by key sources
and debates of the time, requires a close analysis of the Qur’an to begin with, as from this
text spawned many forms of interpretative dialogue. At the center of Islam, this sacred
text informs every aspect of a Muslim’s life. It goes beyond just the spiritual and moral
concepts that are offered in other religions by setting the tone for legal and administrative
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systems that continue to permeate various Muslim countries around the world. The
complicated relationship between these systems and various Muslim civilizations has
often prompted an aggressive use of jihad to further a particular agenda.
However, this text can also not be separated from its historical creation, and from
the evolution of Muslim-based dynasties that relied on it for governance, piety, and social
organization. Thus, the history of jihad must also be understood as the historical
interaction between the Qur’an and developments internal to various societies. Within the
history of Islamic empires, distinct events often inspired widespread change leading to
the emergence of a new structure of society. Oftentimes these events were inspired by the
development of elements either, outside the formal borders of an empire, or, from within
the empire itself. These elements ranged from the arrival of circumstances that allowed a
new set of believers and monotheistic principles to flourish and form a cohesive identity
that challenged late antique empires, to invasions from across the ocean, to dissatisfaction
with the current status quo and the regulation of administrative and legal mechanisms that
governed the empire. Yet, consistently these elements were invoked through a new
interpretation of Islamic texts and their consequent association with powerful
personalities who guided military and social reforms. The role of this key leader should
not be understated in the history of jihad as it is from them that the declaration of jihad
has often occurred. Therefore, contending with the dilemma of who has the authority to
declare jihad after Muhammad and the original caliphs is crucial in how jihad appeared in
different contexts. With each new development impacting Islamic empires, the sentiment
that encouraged jihad shifted several times from issues such as personal obligations to
expansionism or an aggressive agenda. Thus, those that deploy the term in the present
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both embody and reflect this array of interpretations, which should be brought to the fore
in order to maintain the complexity of jihad as both a set of actions and a philosophical
construct.

The Late Antique World and the Prophet Muhammad
To fully understand the development of the Qur’an and its role in Islam, the set of
events that predated its concept must be acknowledged. The late antique world was
defined by conflicts between two major empires, Byzantine and Sasanian, which also
shaped the fortunes of the Arabian Peninsula through trade and proxy wars. These
empires were increasingly defined via hegemonic religions, Christianity and
Zoroastrianism, and thus created a model for the relationship between religion and
regional power that Islam would later emulate. These two empires dominated the lands
from the Near East to the Mediterranean and consequently many territories either fell
directly under their control or at least within their sphere of influence. As a result, the
development of their territories was impacted by political allegiances, religious influence
and economic domination. 1 The Byzantine Empire subscribed to a Christianized form of
the vision of a united world order, with all subjects loyal to the emperor and Orthodox
Church headed by the “patriarch of the Constantinople, in close association with the
emperor.” 2 The relationship between religion and politics gained greater significance in
the Empire when Emperor Constantine, 313 CE, declared Christianity the official faith of

1

Donner, Fred McGraw. Muhammad and the Believers: At the Origins of Islam. Cambridge, MA: Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press, 2010, 4.
2
Ibid., 5.
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his territories in order to promote religious and political unity. 3 The Sasanian Empire was
less regulated and decentralized, according to most sources, until the reign of Khosro I
Anoshirwan in 531 CE, who asserted royal prerogative against the nobility in his various
lands by reorganizing the state and imposing greater central control. 4 While the
Byzantines often experienced several internal conflicts over the correct practices and
traditions of Christianity, in the Sasanian lands, Zoroastrianism had long been associated
with the monarchy as the quasi-official religion of the state. This is not to say that
contentious matters did not exist between the religious elites and political establishment,
but rather it did not display the divisions that existed in the Byzantine Empire. 5 The close
association of monotheistic religions to political order as well as the distinct challenges of
administering such vast arrays of land demonstrated the similarities between the two
empires. Yet, with both monotheistic religions proclaiming universal dominion over the
contested regions, the clash between the Byzantines and the Sasanians was inevitable and
manifested itself in the Arabian Peninsula.
Such deep rooted ideological antagonisms pitted the two empires against each
other for many centuries in the late antique world, yet this battle perhaps reached its
climax during the sixth and seventh centuries. The recognition of the dearth of resources
in the Arabian Peninsula and the access that it provided to trade routes to India and
beyond escalated the strategic importance of gaining control over the area. 6 Yet, the
difficulty of attaining direct control of these territories was highlighted by fierce

3

Ibid., 8.
Ibid., 18.
5
Ibid., 20.
6
Ibid., 31-32.
4
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hostilities to prevent such a reality from materializing. Therefore, the need to prevent an
overextension of resources in trying to win these lands outright and administer them
uninterrupted, involved various tribes in the Arabian Peninsula. As a result, wars by
proxy emerged between the Byzantines and the Sasanians that resulted in certain tribes in
the Arabian Peninsula protecting the trade interests of a particular empire and often
attacking the other empire. The constant presence of these empires in the Arabian
Peninsula led to the gradual receding of paganism and the arrival of monotheism. 7 The
numerous wars left them both severely weakened by 630 CE and provided the backdrop
for the Muhammad’s career.
The importance of trade routes to the economies of these empires was central in
developing Mecca as a major commercial center. Its central location in the heart of
southern Arabia meant that a majority of trading goods passed through this city on their
way to the ports in Yemen or other southern cities. 8 Consequently, the acknowledgment
of this factor attracted many new individuals to the land and contributed to its burgeoning
environment. As Mecca continued to grow, the Quraysh clan assumed control over it
with their two major focuses orienting around religion and commerce. 9 The clan’s
participation in various trading fairs as well as acting as the guardians of many religious
objects, most significantly the Ka’ba, whom many individuals and groups visited Mecca
to practice religious duties, brought the clan into contact with many other communities. 10
The security that came with being the protectors of such religious objects also bolstered

7

Ibid.,
Ibid., 37.
9
Ibid., 40.
10
Ibid.
8
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the commercial activity of the city. Thus, the creation of an elaborate political system
around the pilgrimage to the Ka’ba, organized through the auspices of the Quraysh clan,
highlighted a process that had already begun unification across the Peninsula. Yet, the
circulation of wealth led to disadvantaged groups seeking alternatives to the clan, and
would eventually prove receptive to Muhammad’s message, which replaced the clan.
Muhammad was born in Mecca during this prosperous time, as part of the
Qurayshi clan. Orphaned at an early age, Muhammad grew into a respected individual
amongst the Qurayshi people, eventually marrying his first wife Khadija. 11 While the
narrative of Muhammad’s life is primarily told through biographies internal to the faith,
the general consensus is around the age of 40, Muhammad began to retreat from public
life. Taking refuge at the foot of Mount Hira, Muhammad is believed to have had his first
revelation, which became known as the Prayer for Guidance. 12 During these revelations,
the angel Gabriel appeared to Muhammad on a night in the month of Ramadan and
forced him to recite the first four verses of what would eventually be the Qur’an. 13
Muhammad’s early preaching brought him few followers and it was predominantly his
wife and uncle, Abu Talib, who truly listened to his words. Abu Talib, a well-respected
member of the Qurayshi clan was able to provide a degree of security for Muhammad
that allowed him to spread his revelations in Mecca. However, the death of both Abu
Talib and Khadija left Muhammad with little support and at the mercy of the Qurayshi
elite. Regardless of the fact that Muhammad had not gained much notoriety at the time,
11

Ibid.
Muir, William, and T. H. Weir. The Life of Mohammad from Original Sources. Edinburgh: J. Grant,
1923, 4-8., 38.
13
Lewis, Bernard. The Middle East: A Brief History of the Last 2,000 Years. New York, NY: Scribner,
1995, 51.
12
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his words were considered troublesome by the Qurayshi religious elites and their
influence forced Muhammad to move his preaching to the towns on the outskirts of
Mecca. 14 It was at this moment Muhammad’s movement began to gain momentum
through its attractiveness to the people from the neighboring city of Yathrib. A place that
had been plagued by internal conflict and divisions between the varying political factions,
Yathrib longed for healing. 15 Thus, between the Yathribis continuous invitations to bring
his teachings to their city and the increased opposition to Muhammad’s prayers by the
Qurayshi, he agreed to make the journey. This moment came to be known as hijra or the
emigration from Mecca to what would later become Medina, by Muhammad and his
followers in 622 CE. 16 Perhaps even more significant was the consolidation of political
power that Muhammad was able to achieve in Yathrib by concluding an agreement
between the various clans. The idea of belonging to a single community that Muhammad
communicated to his new found followers was the birthplace of the Muslim umma, which
also incorporated non-believers through treaty negotiations. 17 The alignments that
Muhammad made would become of great significance because they eventually became
powerful enough to ultimately re-conquer Mecca, and then unify the Peninsula under the
authority of Muhammad and his military commanders.
As the revelations could come to Muhammad at any point in his life, the
compilation of the Qur’an is of significant importance to the history of Islam. The birth of
the oral tradition of Islam has its roots in the fact that with every new revelation

14

Donner., 42.
Ibid.
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid., 44.
15
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Muhammad received, he would recite it to those around them, who in turn would learn it
and recite it to others. 18 As these revelations continued, a close group of followers, who
travelled with him, began to write down and memorize the recitations so as to preserve
them for the future. This method proved successful until a year after the death of
Muhammad at the Battle of Yamama (633 CE) where “a number of those who knew the
Qur’an by heart died.” 19 The consequent realization that along with the deaths of these
followers, there was the possibility that the revelations of the Qur’an would be lost as
well, Abu Bakr, the first caliph and successor to the Prophet, ordered that a written copy
of the whole body of Qur’anic material should be made and stored with him. 20 Yet, as the
Islamic expansion continued, the third caliph, Uthman, called for a number of copies to
be made and dispersed to different parts of the Muslim world as the official copy of the
Qur’an. 21 This traditional narrative of the ordering and compilation of the Qur’an
symbolizes the moment that Islam began to extend beyond the regions of Mecca and
Medina and permeate the lives of people that now acknowledged the religion as a central
part of their identity. 22
The role of the late antique world and the birth of Islam within it highlights how
many of the concepts attributed exclusively to Islam, had their roots in the broader
dynamics of the region. The need for territorial expansion by the Byzantine and Sasanian
Empires, closely associated with religious precedents, predate the birth of Islam and
provided the foundations of a framework that justified war long before the emergence of
A., Abdel Haleem M. The Qurʼan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, xv.
Ibid., xvi.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
22
There have been some recent contestations about the exact date that the Qur’an was formally canonized,
yet, the general sequence of events is accepted by scholars of the topic.
18
19
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jihad and Islam. Moreover, the events that took place between the major empires helped
foster the environment that would allow for another monotheistic religion to emerge. As a
result, the exhaustion of the Byzantine and Sasanian empires through long warfare and
the emergence of a vibrant new ideology that began to unify the Arabian Peninsula gave
birth to Islam. While Muhammad was alive, he did successfully venture into conflicts
with these declining empires, yet, his successors would quickly conquer territory from
both, and ultimately incorporate the Sasanian Empire into its own new political
heartlands, first in Damascus and then Baghdad.

Issues with Qur’anic Interpretation
The Qur’an is itself a text produced by distinct events and circumstances that
together yield its dynamism as a scripture. Therefore, scholarship that uses the Qur’an as
an ahistorical creation overlooks the conditions that led to the formalization of the ideas
and themes that are contentious today. The oral tradition that predated the written
compilation of the original manuscript inherently recognizes a certain truth that was
vocalized to the Prophet Muhammad, by the angel Gabriel, which may have been lost in
the book’s manifestation. While writing was not common during Muhammad’s time,
there were certain scribes who noted down oral recitations at the time before they were
compiled into a single text.23 However, the fact that many of those followers died before
they could also write down these revelations allows for varying interpretations of what
the Qur’an states since the “decided lack of agreement destroys the classic argument of
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divinely guided evolution and reveals its origin as a theoretical solution to the problem of
Quranic contract.” 24 As a result, this piece work acknowledges how there may be gaps in
what the text was intended to communicate and the interpretation of the results, which
have been jaded through the loss of original oral insights as well as the subsequent loss
that comes through translations. However, despite these obstacles there is much to take
from using the Qur’an as the backbone of a framework that connected religious and
political institutes during war, as all the proceeding events directly refer to the text as
their inspiration in one form or another.
The gaps that permeate the study of Islam and jihad prompt both historians and
readers to be more aware and conduct greater discrimination of the evidence that is
available. By overlooking such a significant factor, it may force a “focus on a single
narrative of origin [which] can lead us to forget that any act of founding becomes obscure
in retrospect, because it necessarily includes an element of myth.” 25 Knowledge of the
early formation and expansion of both Islam and the Qur’an comes from outsiders to the
emergent faith or from Muslim scholars themselves. Moreover, scholars within the faith
quite early debated the community’s history, the appropriate version of the Qur’an, and
the meaning of individual verses. The tension that exists between interpretations and texts
that have been derived or advanced from previous concepts is represented by the
differing opinions, both between Muslim and non-Muslim scholars as to the origin of
Islam and the development of a religious orthodoxy. These factors all complicate any

Firestone, Reuven. Jihād: The Origin of Holy War in Islam. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999,
51.
25
Bonner, Michael David. Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practice. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2006, 15.
24

Tracing Islamic Extremist Ideologies | 20

historical assessment of how specific verses were interpreted or acted upon in different
historical contexts. The nature of verse relationship highlights the layers of difficulty that
originate in understanding, jihad, the Qur’an and Islam. When taken in isolation the
Qur’an can provide an individual with justifications for many actions that may prove
controversial. Therefore, acknowledging that the revelations of the Prophet Muhammad
were part of a broader narrative for the conduct of Islam is pivotal in determining how to
comprehend jihad.
The recognition of these factors prompts a brief insight into where the dilemma
occurs and what realizations one can draw from the emergence of the Qur’an itself.
According to the standard Muslim view, “Muhammad was confronted with many
different and inconstant predicaments during his evolving mission as prophet
extraordinaire,” meaning that a variety of his actions can be viewed as responsive or
reactionary to the situation at the time. 26 Moreover, “since the imam or caliph could not
be everywhere at once, it was always necessary for him to delegate his authority in
certain matters” highlighting the possibility of an initial departure from the revelations
that Muhammad received. 27 The fragmented nature of the creation of the Qur’an further
problematizes the issues of interpretation. However, this does not accurately reflect the
state in which Muslim societies developed; it would be a broad generalization to think
that despite Muhammad’s influence one can “reduce so many societies and polities
covering such broad extents of time and space, to any single governing principle.” 28
Thus, assessing the Qur’an as a historical text highlights the problems of interpretation
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that is at the heart of any historical inquiry. This concept was discovered quickly by
scholars, jurists and other religious functionaries associated with Islam as they often
debated how the Qur’an was formed, what its canonical shape should be, and then how to
connect the context of scripture to the ever-changing realities of time. Therefore, in
further exploration of events that invoked jihad, recognizing that controversies exist
regarding Qur’anic interpretation is central to shaping any understanding of a particular
event.
Furthermore, the term jihad and the various places and various forms it takes in
the Qur’an, also complicate issues of interpretative. In its most literal form, jihad is a
“verbal noun of the third Arabic form of the root, jahada, which is defined classically as
exerting one’s utmost power, efforts, or ability in contending with an object of
disapprobation.” 29 There is some consistency with this definition, with the base concept
of “exerting oneself as much as one can” in order to achieve a certain end. 30 Such
agreements between various scholars takes away from the popular conception that jihad
means holy war, instead highlighting how these different entities have slowly been
associated with one another. However, what is evident from the consistency of these
definitions is that the Arabic root of jihad, j-h-d, requires commitment and explicit intent.
The ability to exert oneself to one’s full capacity hints at the complete submission to the
task at hand. Anything that reflects behavior other than complete dedication can be
discounted as emblematic of jihad, as it has been translated and understood in its most
literal sense.
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Situating Jihad in the Larger Conceptual Framework
While these definitions do originate from literal translations and applications of
jihad, such terms are used in broad and multifaceted ways. Therefore, the process of
translation from the original context to different historical moments must be addressed. In
many respects the definition of jihad “must be based both on what Muslims have written
concerning the subject and on the historical record how they have practiced it,” thus
inherent to this idea, is how jihad has been used in a particular time. 31 Therefore, using
the Qur’an as the cornerstone of this analysis means that independent statements that
mention jihad are not representative of broader themes in the text but rather how
“understanding the meaning lies in verse relationships and the fact that the contexts of
many pronouncements remain uncertain.” 32 Consequently, the literal and historical
translation that takes place when jihad is applied in different contexts requires intense
interpretation as “it is usually impossible to reconstruct the context of the utterances from
the text of the Scripture itself.” 33 As a result, just as the Qur’an is a product of a series of
events and oral traditions “the doctrine of jihad had a role of its own events,” leading to
the popular concepts that exist in society today. 34 This phenomenon highlights how the
interpretation of the Qur’an and jihad is itself an object of some debate and concern
within the evolving scholarship on jihad. Therefore, contemporary use of jihad implicitly
embodies varying interpretations, which must be acknowledged in order to represent
jihad accurately as a command and an ideal.
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The conjuncture between particular dynamics of conflict, the tradition of
scholarship and interpretation of jihad, and the way it is ultimately deployed in that
setting reveals at a fundamental level how criticisms of the religion are particular to a
context. The nuances of where jihad is situated in the broader religion does not fully
acknowledge the various forms that jihad can take. The fact that from the literal
translation of jihad one can see how it can be applied to different aspects of the individual
and the collectives lives, hints at the more problematic issue of understanding which form
is being applied and whether multiple forms can be applied at the same time. Navigating
the dynamic between the various forms of jihad can only be done through “recognizing a
broad spectrum of paradigms reflected by varied cultural and religious setting in which
they may be found.” 35 Thus, the way in which particular actors embrace jihad
demonstrates the significant role that context and interpretive variation play in its usage
and invocation. This allows one to distinguish between acts of jihad from the religion as a
whole. Moreover, the varying types of jihad further highlights how “many kinds of jihad
have nothing to do with warfare,” revealing that the literal struggle jihad refers to can be
reoriented into an aggressive idea if the individual deems his struggle worthy of such a
dimension. 36 Building out from the various intricacies that exist within jihad, has seen a
formation of several types:
Jihad of the Heart, i.e. struggling against one’s sinful inclinations, the
Jihad of the Tongue, i.e. ordering what is food and forbidding what is evil,
the Jihad of the Hand, i.e. administering of disciplinary measures such as
beating, by rulers and men of authority in order to prevent people from
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committing abominable acts, and, finally, the Jihad of the Sword, i.e.
fighting the unbelievers for religion’s sake. 37
The fact that jihad can be interpreted in a variety of different ways and is the
product of a series of events and actions means that it is only logical that jihad was used
in radically different ways by scholars and administrators depending on historical
circumstances. Yet, all of these interpretations attempt to define both the religious and
geographic integrity of Islam, and to preserve it in the face of internal and external threats
called either the “territory of Islam, the part of the world where this is Moslem rule and
the shari’ah is applied and the rest of the world, called the territory of war.” 38 The
former, known as the Dar al-Islam, is not explicitly mentioned in the Qur’an but evolved
from the term Dar al-Salam that appears in sura 10:25, and exists in the world as places
that Muslims can practice their faith in peace and are governed by a Muslim ruler.
Whereas the territory of war, or the Dar al-Harb, refers to the areas that are not governed
by Muslim law. If the world is perceived as a binary by Muslims, then jihad must take on
infinite number of possibilities in order to reconcile and contain all aspects of human
experiences into these categories. If this is the case then “it is important to note one aim
of jihad is not necessarily to bring conquered peoples to convert to Islam, but to enlarge
the domain of Islam, the Dar al-Islam, at the expense of Dar al-Harb.” 39 This sentiment
changes the perception of whether or not jihad can be viewed as a solely aggressive or
expansionist agenda. Instead, the motivating factors of how one should pursue jihad
become more intrinsic in reconciling with the religion itself and about consolidating
community. As a result, it makes sense that these spheres are so broadly defined,
37
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regarding what constitutes war and who Muslims believe themselves to be at war with,
because the “loose and vague definitions of the situation depend only on their
perspectives and interpretation.” 40 Recognition of how contexts and interpretations differ
is a testament to how jihad has been embraced in varying manners all in the name of
Islam.

The Divine Word and Historical Contingencies
As jihad was invoked in different contexts based on different premises, and as
legal and theological interpretations developed from the ninth century onwards, these
issues of Qur’anic interpretation came to the fore. This brief tour of the complexities
inherent in the interpretation of jihad, within the evolving religion of Islam, opens up a
space to engage with particular passages in the Qur’an. The first mention of jihad in the
Qur’an appears to refer not to warfare, but rather to disputation and efforts made for the
sake of God and in his cause. As the Qur’an states:
And strive hard for Allah with due striving (wa-jahidu fi illahi haqqa
jihadihi). He has chosen you and has not laid upon you any hardship in
religion - the faith of your father Abraham. He named you Muslims before
and in this that the Messenger may be a bearer of witness to you, and you
may be bearers of witness to people, so keep up prayer and hold fast to
Allah. He is your Protector; excellent the Protector and excellent the
Helper. 41
This passage addresses an inherent debt Muslims owe to God, and the struggle they must
conduct in order to repay the debt simply for the fortune of being a born a Muslim. The
resulting sentiment, therefore, focuses on the effort necessary to live a life that is worthy
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of God, or of the privilege inherent in leading an enlightened life synonymous with Islam.
The reference to this fortune comes from “the revelation of Abraham, who prayed that
from among his descendants should arise a nation of Muslims,” that should strive to lead
a life of peace. 42 Yet, this struggle is heightened because peace needs to be with God and
the lack of direct guidance leads to the direct involvement of the individual in deciding
how to live that peaceful life. The fact that being a Muslim presumes a life of privilege
that is intrinsic to other religions, or so the Qur’an states, perhaps, provides greater
impetus and opportunity for Muslims to work towards their greater jihad. This changes
the sense of struggle that a Muslim faces, because there are less external aspects to
engage with. Instead, it pushes the struggle inwards and out of this comes the concept of
a greater jihad.
The idea of the greater jihad is mentioned more explicitly later in the Qur’an,
where it states that Muslims should “obey not the disbelievers, and strive against them a
mighty striving with it (wa-jahidhum jihadan khabiran).” 43 In this context a relationship
is formed between jihad and an external group of people known as the “disbelievers,”
presumably both certain kinds of Muslims and non-Muslims. The struggle between a
particular kind of Muslim, one that is most representative of God’s will on earth, and
“disbelievers” may come from the struggle to spread the word of God and convince
others of the righteousness and holiness that exists in this way of life. However, it creates
the possibility that fighting may be necessary for the message of the Qur’an to spread
amongst all groups and peoples. As such “amongst Muslims who acknowledge the
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associations of jihad with warfare, most would define the term as warfare authorized by a
legitimate representative of the Muslim community for the sake of an issue that is
universally acknowledged to be of critical importance for the entire community.” 44 As
time has progressed the authority that gives permission for warfare associated with jihad,
has changed significantly depending on the context and this had led to different
perspectives on when an issue is represented as a threat to the entire religion. Yet, what
cannot be disputed is how those undertaking jihad, under all circumstances, should serve
the purpose of “strengthening Islam” whether that comes from a personal, spiritual level
or an aggressive campaign. 45
Such complexities create a conjunction of multiple definitions of jihad where
there is the potential for both the internal war and external adversaries to merge into the
same conflict. This presents the problem of “what it means to have such an adversary and
to make war against it.” 46 Therefore, when striving to live a life in line with Islam, one
also battles right and wrong orientations of faith. In achieving the right orientation,
Muslims must harmoniously align the right orientation of the self to God, of the specific
community, and of the larger framework of the umma. The implementation of jihad in all
of these domains suggests an effort to keep the many factors in alignment with each
other. This effort is both a ‘natural’ everyday effort, and an extraordinary one during
moments of outright warfare. Hence, when there are aspects of this personal struggle that
manifests themselves in the external domain “Muslims have then extended this principle
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to expansionist military campaigns, which are justified to them, since all wars are in the
way of Allah.” 47
The framework of jihad, provided by the Qur’an, suggests that Muslims should
continually exert a personal struggle in order to align the interests of self and community
to those of the divine. This personal struggle and the explicit goal of preserving the
sanctity of the community, then leads to the possibility of facing external threats, within
the framework of jihad, now projected as an adversary. Moreover, it also highlights how
jihad is “an obligation for the community as a whole,” creating a perpetual state of
tension for Muslims both internally and externally. 48 While this projection may align
itself with the principles of jihad and striving in the path of God, the authority that
declares jihad in these instances still engages an interpretive act, based on historical
contingency. Interpretation, even when derived from Qur’an, faces internal conundrums
as to its meaning and directives for how to conduct jihad. Therefore, the possibility
emerges that such a jihad may not accurately reflect the path of God and consequently
diverges from divine intent inscribed in the Qur’an. The many parts of the Qur’an that an
individual can relate to and align with regarding jihad are numerous in number and
highlight how the “conflicting Quranic verses cannot prove an evolution of the concept of
jihad for religiously authorized warring in Islam from nonaggressive to a militant
stance.” 49 Verses in the Qur’an, if carefully assessed, reveal the multiple ways in which
jihad can be understood and explored as both a moral guide and a declaration of war
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In the verses that pertain directly to “jihad of the sword” in the Qur’an there are
statements such as “fight them until there is no persecution, and religion is only for Allah.
But if they desist, then there should be no hostility except against the oppressors.” 50 Two
likely conclusions that could be drawn from this phrase reflect both a more aggressive
jihad as well as a more internal jihad. In the former, there seems to be a more obvious
idea that the only surviving religion should be that of God’s, or what is assumed to be the
community of Islam. Therefore, the idea of desisting, in line with this thought, implicitly
implies that those resistors should convert to Islam because that may be viewed as the
ultimate surrender to God’s will. However, looking at the relationship between those who
desist and those who are still oppressing, then it appears that when the persecution ceases,
people are at liberty to practice any religion that best reflects their sense of faith, and the
fighting should stop. In this context, those who continue to oppress can be seen as more
non-religious entities as opposed to anti-Muslim entities. This revelation is further
highlighted when connected to another sura from the Qur’an that states:
Those who are driven from their homes without a just cause except that
they say: Our Lord is Allah. And if Allah did not repel some people by
others, cloisters, and churches, and synagogues, and mosques in which
Allah’s name is much remembered, would have been pulled down. And
surely Allah will help him who helps Him. Surely Allah is Strong,
Mighty. 51
This connection highlights how Muslims did not only fight for the protection of their
sacred spaces but also for those of other religions of the book, laying down broad
principles of religious tolerance. This idea reflects how the spiritual jihad ideology
reveals even greater sacrifice as it contains a suggestion that Muslim lives should not
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only be laid down for the protection of Islam but also for their monotheistic counterparts,
in what has been deemed as an attempt to establish “perfect religious freedom.” 52 If this
is the motivating factor for what drives those trying to fulfill their greater jihad, then the
incentive to act accordingly and deliver such results becomes the protection of others as
well, because it is explicitly stated that “religion is only for Allah.” Therefore, this
sentiment reflects an effort to ensure that there is no persecution in the name of religion,
and everyone is at liberty to hold any beliefs that suits their needs.
The relevance of reading beyond a single verse to gain an accurate image of
intention in the Qur’an is further highlighted in a selection on fighting in defense. The
Qur’an states “fight in the way of Allah against those who fight against you but be not
aggressive. Surely Allah loves not the aggressors,” which is one of the first references in
the text that permits Muslims to fight. 53 Yet, fighting “in the way of Allah” is later
clarified in the verse to mean only fight against those who wage war upon you. Yet, it
would appear that the next verse provides a more hostile dynamic when the Qur’an states:
Kill them wherever you find them, and drive them out from where they
drove you out, and persecution is worse than slaughter. And fight not with
them at the Sacred Mosque until they fight with you in it; so if they fight
you in it, slay them. Such is the recompense of the disbelievers. 54
At a first glance, the reference of “them” reinforces the binary between those who
practice Islam and those who do not or at least those who do not practice according to
God’s interpreted intentions. Therefore, this text is often referenced as proof of a violent
interpretation of Islam, a religion that condones violence against those who do not
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possess the same beliefs. However, this perception overlooks the contextual factors that
inform these verses. In these circumstances, the Muslim population was few in number
and was by no means searching for an active and aggressive military campaign, instead
the enemies of Islam, for example the Qurayshi peoples, could see this as an opportunity
to remove Islam from the Arabian lands. 55 In this instance it is actually the Muslim
demographic that was being persecuted, clarified when the Qur’an states later “they will
not cease fighting you until they turn you back from your religion, if they can.” 56 The fact
that these verses are a continuation of the same set of circumstances that were meant to
represent the emerging polity of Islam at the time, highlights how there was no other
option for the Muslim community to take up jihad of the sword against their enemies or
else risk being wiped from the face of the earth. Moreover, the aggressive tone is
tempered when focusing on the importance of location in the aforementioned verses. The
sense that Muslims should not seek wholesale extermination when reclaiming the lands
that they lost, especially ones of sacred importance, such as Mecca, reveals that Islamic
motivations should not come from vengeance but from the closest spiritual alignment
with God, hence the need to recapture these places. As a result, recognizing how
particular verses in the Qur’an that fuel popular notions of aggressiveness and warmongering are in fact a product of a particular situation becomes an important component
in assessing the relationship between history and interpretation. Thus, reconciling how to
interpret these verses in modern contexts presents the problem of acknowledging what
aspects of the context have changed, and what aspects are similar.
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Further exploration of verses that appear to work towards consolidating the
concept of Islam as an aggressive religion and jihad being the vehicle through which it is
expressed can also illuminate how these verses need a significant amount of in depth
analysis before reaching a conclusion. In what is seen as the Sword Verses the Qur’an
states:
Slay the idolaters, wherever you find them, and take them captive and
besiege them and lie in wait for them in every ambush. But if they repent
and keep up prayer and pay the poor-rate, leave their way free. Surely
Allah is Forgiving, Merciful. 57
Echoing the previous aggressive tone of the verses that also suggest the need to seek out
those who wish to vanquish Islam from the world, this verse also requires a closer look at
context and the audience in order to understand the application of the label “idolaters.”
The circumstances of these events define idolaters as those tribes of Arabia that made
agreements with Muslims allowing the safe passage for the Holy Pilgrimage, only to
violate them. 58 This realization clarifies the second part of the verse, which would
initially suggest that the only options Muslims have in pursuing jihad is either killing the
enemy or converting them to Islam, when in fact, because the verse actually refers to a
specific group of people, these conclusions cannot accurately represent the message at
hand. Thus, the opportunity for such traitorous people to join Islam is the only
opportunity that the early Muslim movement could adopt in the face of an abandoned
treaty agreement. The idea that Muslims were permitted to kill others simply because
they did not practice Islam is further nullified in the next verse where the Qur’an states
“if anyone of the idolaters seek thy protection, protect him till he hears the word of Allah,
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then convey him to his place of safety. This is because they are a people who know
not.” 59 Consequently, it was not the importance of a person’s religious preference that led
them into conflict with Muslims but rather, a more contingent factor was the emphasis on
who was responsible for initiating war. This aspect of religious conflict is exemplified by
the fact that the Qur’an allows an opportunity for a captive to hear the words of God and
then make a choice as to whether to convert or not. The role of the Muslim is to
guarantee his captives safety until they are at a place deemed to be free from harm, which
could be broadened to include sacred religious spaces from other religions. From what is
initially perceived to be aggressive dialogue that reflects the popularization of jihad as a
tool of mass violence and a sweeping need of conversion or extermination, reveals
instead a set of historical contingencies and a spiritual quest for perfection and alignment
with God’s principles.

The Battle of Badr
This emphasis on context and verse relationship as a methodology to explore how
jihad was perceived or enacted enables a more nuanced understanding of its role within
the larger orientation of Islam. In order to further exemplify this methodology, an
examination of a particular instance where the Prophet Muhammad was involved in battle
and reconcile it with the framework created, reveals how this contingency becomes the
structure for future events that invoke jihad. The Battle of Badr was a key battle in the
early days of Islam and a turning point in Muhammad's struggle with his opponents
among the Quraysh in Mecca. It is one of the few battles that were specifically recorded
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in the Qur’an, suggesting its importance in deriving circumstances for Muslims to engage
in war in the following years. 60 Muhammad who was born into the large conglomeration
of Qurayshi tribes, but fled to Yathrib (later renamed as the city of the Prophet, Medina)
when the Meccans began persecuting Muslims, looked at how to recoup all the
possessions that were forcibly taken from the Muslims that fled Mecca. 61 This
development aligns with previous notions that explain how Muslims should only engage
in acts of aggression when oppressed in the first place. While there are varying
interpretations as to how precisely the Battle of Badr began, tensions certainly escalated
when blood was spilled on a Muslim raid of a Meccans caravan. 62 The Qur’an reflects on
these instances when it states:
So you slew them not but Allah slew them, and thou smotest not when
thou didst smite the enemy, but Allah smote him, and that He might confer
upon the believers a benefit from Himself. Surely Allah is Hearing,
Knowing. 63
The sense of divine intervention that permeates this verse and highlights how it was not
really the Muslims that killed the Qurayshi people but rather that it was God who slew
Qurayshi people, creates the impression that God was directly involved in the affairs of
his followers. This interpretation is of utmost importance because it reflects the sense of
desperation the Muslim people were facing from an enemy that significantly
outnumbered them, hence the need for God’s intervention in order to prevent the
followers from extinction. This belief is reinforced later in this section when the Qur’an
states:
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If you sought a judgment, the judgment has indeed come to you; and if
you desist, it is better for you. And if you return to fight, we too shall
return and your forces will avail you nothing, though they may be many;
and know that Allah is with the believers. 64

The suggestion, in the midst of battle, that virtue may lie in desisting, returns to the
tension between internal striving and external action that opened the discussion of the
multiple meanings of jihad. This verse creates and emphasizes the need for jihad to be a
collective duty as any decision ultimately made, requires a consensus amongst the group.
The tone of this verse suggests that regardless of how the battle developed there was
always a sentiment that the Muslim population should consider an alternative to
bloodshed. Therefore, portraying Muhammad as the aggressor in the Battle of Badr
downplays or denies the persecution of early Muslims in Medina, which in many ways
was the catalyst for the ensuing events.
The Battle of Badr accentuates how attaining the moral high ground is a
significant component when invoking jihad and may signify how an individual embraces
jihad. The Qur’an highlights this idea when it states:
Those with whom thou makest an agreement, then they break their
agreement every time, and they keep not their duty,
And further:
And if thou fear treachery on the part of a people, throw back to them
(their treats) on terms of equality. Surely Allah loves not the treacherous.
And if they intend to deceive thee, then surely Allah is sufficient for thee.
He is Who strengthened thee with His help and with the believers. 65
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These verses reveal the type of war imagined within the Qur’an, later interpreted in
various ways by Muslim polities. The nature of maintaining respect and honor with the
opposing party seems to guide the moral jihad that the Qur’an preaches. Reflecting on the
first verse, it shows how the opponents of Islam disregarded their responsibility and
violated their agreements during the Battle of Badr. 66 The use of the words “every time”
with regard to these violations also highlights how Muslims were willing to make new
agreements despite the lack of trust and respect displayed by the Quraysh. It is only when
the enemy violates the agreement, that the Qur’an permits Muslims also to repeal the
treaty, yet, the Qur’an tries to bind its people to the agreement for as long as possible.
This concept is suggested in the second verse mentioned above, where mere
apprehension of the opponent’s behavior is not enough to justify the termination of an
agreement. This should be adhered to even if there is some intention to deceive the
opponent under a guise of peace, for still, Muslims should accept the peace and deal with
the resulting consequences when they eventually rise.
The development of jihad and its early form of implementation, seen through the
Battle of Badr, create an early precedent for the need for forgiveness, religious liberty and
mindfulness when pursuing some aspects of aggressive military behavior. One can see
how “the doctrine of jihad was actually a re-orientation of the war-like raiding of the preIslamic Qurayshi Arabs,” thus shaping the nature in which jihad was undertaken. 67 The
nature of verse relationship and context that defined how jihad was implemented at the
onset of Islam is crucial in making comparisons to other moments where jihad was
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reinterpreted. This approach is crucial for assessing how jihad and the Qur’an was a
product of a series of events. The importance of the developmental process is also central
in breaking the ‘us’ vs ‘them’ binary that is currently perpetuated by supposed Muslim
elements that have imposed their own interpretive rubrics on the intentions of the Qur’an.
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II
Salah al-Din and Jihad: The Resurgence of a Sunni Islamic Identity
through the Chroniclers of the Crusades

M

erely a few centuries after Islam constructed an ideological framework
for conducting warfare, the Arabian world was plummeted into what is

remembered as one of the greatest religious ideological battles to take place, the
Crusades. Spanning almost 200 years, the Crusades acted as a catalyst for the Muslim
world to acknowledge and address the idea of territorial sovereignty, a united Muslim
identity and the threat of external adversaries. The failure of the Muslim states to protect
their own territories in the aftermath of the First Crusade prompted a reevaluation of how
to connect the various political motivations and mentalities that had led to the divisions
exploited by the Crusaders. Such strategies were first approached by Nur al-Din, who
began to lay the pieces of a coordinated Muslim effort to reclaim the lost territory. Yet,
his successor, Salah al-Din, saw even greater promise in how this effort could be tied to
the pillars of Islam and provide the moral and motivational backbone needed to fully
succeed in a war with the Christians. Therefore, this chapter will examine the primary
sources of Salah al-Din’s time who constructed a particular image of the ruler and his
relationship to Islam in order to leverage religious principles toward a specific end. By
reconciling the tentative framework for jihad and its applicability, with the chronicler’s
portrayal of individuals during the Crusades, a timeline can be constructed which
recognizes the pivotal role notions of jihad played in shaping the narrative of particular
historical context.
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Creating the Religious and Political Connection after the First Crusade
The events that allowed Salah al-Din to capitalize on jihadi propaganda and
campaigns against the Crusaders were the foundations of the reorientation and
intensification of Sunni Islam. 1 At the eve of the First Crusades in 1096, the Muslim
world was in a state of complete disarray and disunity, with several centers of powers
such as the Shi’i Fatimid Caliphate, the Seljuq dynasty and local Sunni leaders in Syria.
Thus, there was no attentive focus on the lands across the sea until after the invasion. 2
This disunity existed in a large extent as prior to the First Crusade, a succession of deaths
in both the key power centers of the Islamic world, namely the Seljuq and Fatimid
empires, gave way to disorientation and anarchy. 3 Whether or not the Crusaders were
aware of this fact is ambiguous, but the subsequent timing of their invasion was
extremely fortuitous. The fact that the Muslim world lacked any significant leadership at
the time, especially in areas that received the brunt of the Frankish invasion, meant
coordinating any substantial defense was unlikely to yield great results. 4 Thus, by the
time the Crusaders reached Jerusalem in 1099, any idea of jihad was buried deep under
the political fragmentation of Muslim empires.
The result of the First Crusade prompted a limited spiritual reaction from the
political elites in Arabia that had not been directly impacted by these early campaigns. In
Damascus, the Crusader’s success “generated loud but ineffectual calls for jihad from
members of the Syrian Sunni religious establishment who believed the Frankish invasion
1
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would not have been possible had Muslim political leaders attended to their religious
duty of waging jihad against the Christian infidels.” 5 The earliest example of preaching
on the topic of jihad came from al-Sulami in 1105, whose Book of Jihad blamed Muslims
for their weak spiritual condition and advocated for the greater jihad of internal struggle
and spiritual renewal. 6 However, his calls to jihad were poorly received, suggesting a
level of indifference between Damascene elites, possibly because of the alliance of
convenience with the Crusaders that preserved Damascene independence. 7 The
connection between Damascus and the Crusaders highlights how the aftermath of the
First Crusade did not prompt a universal Muslim reaction or spark an immediate Islamic
revival, but rather cemented the decentralization of power that had emerged in the
preceding centuries.
The possibility that any notion of jihad may have been extinguished altogether
was real until the fall of Edessa in 1144 to Imad ad-Din Zengi. Zengi, the governor of
Mosul and Aleppo, besieged Edessa, the weakest crusader state because of its placement
across the Euphrates and its separation from the Crusader strongholds, such as Jerusalem.
Ironically, Zengi had also tried to capture Damascus in 1137, which was then allied with
the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem, but came to an agreement with the city in 1138. 8
The retaliation of the Crusaders to the fall of Edessa was the catalyst that prompted the
5
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Second Crusade. Zengi’s attack on Edessa provided a spark for some religious entities to
revive the relationship between jihad and military duties, which up to that point could not
be infused into the rulers. This moment in the Crusades reflects upon Zengi as the first
major Muslim leader to recapture territory from the Franks. 9
Instead of trying to recapture Edessa, the Crusaders recognized that the conquest
of Damascus, a major Muslim city, would serve to bolster their power to new heights in
the region. 10 However, this decision proved catastrophic for the Crusaders, as it allowed a
renewed mobilization of Muslim forces in response. The decision to attack Damascus
exposed many in the city to the first hand presence of killing and pillaging by the
Crusaders, which they had not seen because of their previous alliances. 11 Moreover,
when two members of the religious class, al-Findalawi and al-Halhuli who were zealous
protectors of the Sunni Islam, died protecting the city, their martyrdom prompted a
renewed spirit later shaped into the sentiments of jihad. 12 The emotional impact of this
invasion prompted the religious elites to renew their arguments of military duties in the
face of external adversaries.
Al-Sulami’s focus on resurrecting militant piety in Muslim rulers may have had a
limited impact at the time, but his efforts were not completely in vain. A trace of his
arguments manifested themselves in the works of Ibn Asakir who was present in
Damascus during the siege of the Crusaders. With the decline of the Fatimid Shi’i
caliphate, the attack on Damascus allowed Sunni scholars, such as Ibn Asakir, to use this
9
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moment as an opportunity to draw a concrete connection between military duties and
their religious inclinations through the lens of jihad. 13 Zengi’s death in 1146 was met
with the succession of his son, Nur al-Din, who furthered his father’s aggressive
campaigns in the region. A series of victories against the Crusaders that brought Nur alDin control over Asia Minor and made any potential capture of Edessa by the Crusaders
nearly impossible caused the Muslim religious elites in Damascus to recognize his
potential to unify Sunni Islam. 14 Sunni Islam’s unity in Damascus was the long-standing
dream of many religious elites, especially since it was the capital of the first truly Islamic
Empire, the Umayyads. 15 The aftermath of the failed invasion of Damascus by the
Crusaders led to the renewed treaties between the two sides, an action that prompted
outrage amongst the religious elites. Thus, the success of Nur al-Din’s campaigns outside
of Damascus was noted by the elites and he was recognized as an individual who could
carry their banner against the Crusaders. With the leaders of the Damascus continuingly
growing weaker and losing influence over their people, Nur al-Din was finally able to
capture the city in 1154, with the help of the local population and unify both Syria and
Sunni Islam. 16 Upon his arrival in Damascus, Nur al-Din was welcomed by the religious
elites and a connection was born between the two: elites received excessive patronage
from the ruler and in return his ventures were religious endowed. This connection was
reinforced by the parallel emergence of Muslim chroniclers who began to romanticize
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those Muslim rulers who displayed great piety in embracing jihad as the framework for
their conquests against the Crusaders.
Salah al-Din emerges as the most prominent figure of these pious narratives.
Thus, any understanding of Salah al-Din derives from the sources that consciously
crafted his persona in history. This is an important observation to make because
ultimately, Salah al-Din’s relevance to jihad and Islam can only really be seen by how his
contemporaries, military commanders, personal advisers and varying demographics of
the population, saw him and reacted to him. From a broader perspective, understanding
how the Crusades were primarily understood as a Western concept and therefore were
“not treated in any extant Islamic work as an isolated topic, recognizes how it has no
particular resonance for Islamic ears and the Muslim historians are not concerned with
it.” 17 This does not mean that Muslim historians claim the Crusades did not take place,
but rather that the eras significance was interwoven with the development of a Muslim
identity and what it meant for religious and political entities to merge into a common
theme with a common purpose. Moreover, the fact that there is still a wealth of work that
remains inaccessible because of a lack of translation reveals how “the whole
historiographical picture of an event or a reign from the Islamic side cannot be grasped”
inevitably narrowing the lens that we are able to use to understand Salah al-Din and
amplifying a reliance on the memories that do exist. 18 Thus, analyzing these recollections
requires both caution and due diligence when handling the primary sources of the time,
being careful not to overemphasize their importance or “distort them, simply because it
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exists in the first place.” 19 This does not mean that any conclusions drawn are invalid, but
rather that they represent a certain angle and aspect of Salah al-Din’s personality as seen
by specific observers. With this framework in mind, the relationship between a ruler’s
success in his military campaigns and how he is remembered is a “direct link in the
chroniclers’ minds between such literature and military action,” creating the society
through narrative that revered those leaders who waged in war in the name of religion. 20
Salah al-Din’s chroniclers build a particular vision of Salah al-Din’s character
during his rise to the forefront of the Muslim umma. The development of this character is
driven by how these events were variously constructed by chroniclers depending on their
position and own narrative strategies. As a result, whether or not Salah al-Din acted for
personal interest or for the sake of his community and the role that religious conviction
played in his campaigns is colored by how chroniclers represented his actions. The period
of Salah al-Din’s reign generated an unusual amount of evidence for the time, which in
part may be linked to the growing associations between political and religious elites that
began with the successes of Zengi and Nur al-Din. 2122
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This connection is worth keeping in mind when taking a closer look at the works
of Ibn Shaddad and his representations of Salah al-Din because it places more emphasis
on the role of the writer in creating a relationship between Salah al-Din and jihad as
opposed to being reflective of the religion instead. An emphasis on how Salah al-Din
embraced jihad reflects the works of Ibn Shaddad in a more influential light and
accentuates the role the historian played in catapulting Salah al-Din to prominence,
meaning there is additional caution we have to acknowledge when creating a relationship
between Salah al-Din and jihad. Baha ad-Din ibn Shaddad’s 23 recollections of his time as
Salah al-Din’s personal biographer reveal a close insight into the leader’s reign, yet,
“there is also an underlying political message in the work which is implicit in certain
words that are put in the mouth of Salah al-Din himself. Whether the words were really
spoken by the sultan, whether they represent thoughts that the author genuinely
remembered to have been expressed or whether they are purposely inventions it is
impossible to decide.” 24 During Ibn Shaddad’s visit to Jerusalem in 1188, he had
compiled a treatise, which he called The Virtues of Jihad and presented to Salah al-Din.
The treatise earned him the patronage of Salah al-Din, and his permanent enrollment by
June 1188 in the service of Salah al-Din. 25 While his treatise influenced Salah al-Din, the
extent to which it did or how reflective this treatise was of the Qur’an is certainly
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questionable. The treatise itself highlights how Salah al-Din was not independent in his
own understanding of the Qur’an and jihad, and emphasizes the role that Ibn Shaddad
played in shaping the ruler’s connection to Islam. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that
Salah al-Din has often been accused of initiating a policy of expansionism with religious
pretenses when his campaigns were “directed at creating a personal power base strong
enough to take on the Franks” meaning he often fought fellow Muslims and refrained
from attacking the Franks for long periods of time. 2627 However, the need to
communicate an individual that could view the long-term importance of such actions in
order to unify Islam was of greater significance to the narrative that Ibn Shaddad and
other chroniclers wanted to represent for all future generations of Muslims.

Developing the Image of Salah-al Din
Attempts to recount Salah al-Din’s youth and educational exposure are clouded
by the fact that many recollections were in response to his later rise to fame. An Islamic
model of learning, which emphasized exegesis of the Qur’an and hadith, characterized
education during the medieval era. As he was from a respectable family, it is quite likely
that Salah al-Din participated in the normative educational patterns of the time, although
he probably also “as the son of the commandant, the best teaching within reach.” 28 His
father’s rank as regent to Imad ad-Din Zengi suggests that education and the primacy of
Islam surely occupied a more central space in Salah al-Din’s early education, no doubt
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being “drilled for years in the Qur’an, Arabic grammar, and the elements of rhetoric,
poetry, and theology...to instill the Qur’an and traditions, formed the chief aim of the
learned but limited men who were entrusted with the training of distinguished truth.” 29
His education allowed him the avenue to also review the socio-economic context through
literature beyond the Qur’an and learn about the elements of rhetoric through poetry
perhaps highlighting a more complete disposition as opposed to one solely indoctrinated
by Islam. The pivotal role of education in Salah al-Din’s childhood suggests that this
experience could have “helped to identify with his Islamic background.” 30 Combined
with the military connection, his father’s service to Zengi, it is easy to claim a link
between the two as a uniting factor when evaluating his future command. It is crucial to
recognize that while Salah al-Din’s education was predominantly fuelled by Islamic
teachings, this also entailed a more holistic idea of what it meant to form a
comprehensive Muslim identity as part of a more unified sense of collective identity. The
portrayal of Salah al-Din as having strong Islamic roots advances the connection between
religious elites and political patronage. However, the extent to which Salah al-Din truly
embodied the religion at such a young age is suspect in light of the lack evidence
documenting his youth. Much of the representations of Salah al-Din’s early years were
constructed in response to his eventual success as a ruler. Therefore, they only serve to
advance an agenda of the future leader as the champion of Islam.
Characterizations of Salah al-Din’s childhood derive from his father’s privileged
position in the Zengid dynasty and from the hypotheses concerning general patterns of
29
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education and training during the period. If Salah al-Din did have a religious education
that preached the tolerant virtues of Islam then it does call into question the criticisms
that label him as power hungry or searching for a personal glory. At the very least there is
no evidence to suggest that he was destined for the positions he would later achieve. Yet,
these assumptions are just that, assumptions about a boy that history has no real footing
to comment on and ultimately highlights “the fact that for the first twenty-six years of his
life we have had no picture of him at all.” 31 Regardless of the role his father had in the
Zengid dynasty or afterwards when his uncle Shirkuh, Nur al-Din’s right-hand man,
brought him into public life, there were no overwhelming reasons to believe that Salah alDin had the foresight to unite the various territories. 32 However, we can assume that
Salah al-Din was at least surrounded by a political atmosphere that would reinforce
personal ambition and provide avenues for advancement when future opportunities would
arise. Thinking about how able he was to reconcile this environment with his own
personal beliefs and emphasizing jihad as the avenue that would bring the success he
envisioned is, again, suspect in light of the absence of evidence. Therefore, the narratives
that exist tend to restrain from fully glorifying his youth and begin with his role as a
public figure. Thus, any ability to address the motivations of Salah al-Din’s later actions
is merely a conjecture drawn from associations to Islam by his contemporaries.
Salah al-Din’s move to Damascus, the center of Sunni Islam, prompted greater
exposure to the renewed religiously motivated politics that Nur al-Din championed, and
that Salah al-Din would later express. Salah al-Din’s predecessor is often credited with
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creating a religious framework for expansion that Salah al-Din would later utilize in
uniting all the Muslim people. Throughout Nur al-Din’s time as leader there was a real
effort to enable Sunni Islam to flourish with generous sponsorship given to the religious
classes and a patronage of religious monuments to foster places the people could rally
around. 33 The development of this type of rule may have played a part in the formation of
Salah al-Din’s own personality, and as historians have remarked “it is difficult to overstress the influence of Nur al-Din on Salah al-Din’s political education and on his career.
Nur al-Din was an exponent of the politics of growth allied to the ideal of the Holy War,
a manipulator of religious propaganda and a ruler who showed the value of setting men
before money.” 34 The religious spirit embodied by Nur al-Din, or at least portrayed in
this light by religious entities, reflects the reorientation of Sunni Islam and the rise of a
jihadi sentiment that could be advanced by the military. Consequently, acknowledging
how the Sunni religious establishment had once again become a central political factor by
revamping their image through the connection drawn between religion and politics
furthers the narrative behind any jihadi ideology. Therefore, Salah al-Din’s own display
of trying to lead a spiritually governed way of life also played into the rhetoric that would
allow for a smooth transition after the reign of Nur al-Din. The connection between the
religious and political elites created a mode of government that combatted the Crusaders;
therefore, upsetting this balance at this moment in time would destabilize Islamic
attempts to reconquer the lands they had lost.
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Thus, the first instances where we can see Salah al-Din attain any position of note
are upon his appointment as Vizier of Egypt. There are many possible explanations for
why Salah al-Din was promoted to this position. Ibn Athir suggests that he was weak and
young, which made him an appropriate puppet leader for Nur al-Din. 35 Yet, the reasons
for his appointment become less relevant when evaluating how he handled and eventually
thrived in this role possibly leading to his eventual rise to fame. His introduction to Egypt
prompted a radical change in the operating of the city with the idea that it would be
“dressed with religion” showing the first signs of Salah al-Din’s bond with his faith and
the space it occupied in the way he administered his reign. 36 His need to stamp his
authority on Egypt was never so aptly seen as when recorded by Ibn al-Athir who
recalled a speech Salah al-Din made to his new subjects:
If Nur al-Din, had thought any of you capable of taking my place or being
trusted as he trusted me, he would have appointed him to the governors of
Egypt, the most important of all his possessions. If death had not
prevented him, he would have bequeathed to none but me the guardianship
and bringing up of his son. I perceive that to my hurt you have arrogated
to yourselves the care of my Master, the son of my Master. Assuredly I
will come to do him homage and repay the benefits of his father by
service, which shall be remembered forever; and I shall deal with each of
you according to His work, the abandoning of the defense of the King’s
dominion. 37
Such a display that Salah al-Din made to his people was perhaps emblematic of what the
future held in store, the need to deliver justice in accordance with “his” law leaves an
ambiguous suggestion of whether or not he was referring to the Prophet and Allah or Nur
al-Din. To a certain extent, it provided the baseline for rule grounded in the principles of
35
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Islam, because Nur al-Din himself was pivotal in revitalizing the Muslim identity prior to
Salah al-Din’s emergence. Thus this speech can be viewed as an extension of a strong
core of Islamic beliefs.
In line with the education that Salah al-Din probably received in Syria, there is no
doubt that the influences of Nur al-Din would have further amplified the religious
dimensions of Salah al-Din’s own thought process. As Salah al-Din began to emerge as
both a man and leader in his own right, there were traces that Nur al-Din’s ruling style
resonated with his own as “of all the treasures that he found, Salah al-Din kept nothing
for himself. Some he distributed among his followers or presented to Nur al-Din...the rest
of the treasure was sold for the public purse.” 38 Behaviors such as these represent how
Salah al-Din was furthering the notion of creating a more spiritually governed way of life
for the public, placing their needs at a premium in comparison to his. The reflection of
Nur al-Din’s ruling style in Salah al-Din’s nature, prefaced the actions he would take in
his most official role to date, as Vizier of Egypt. It foreshadowed the importance of how
governing with religious underpinnings was key to maintaining control and creating a
Muslim identity.
There is certainly an opportunity in creating a religious atmosphere in order to
secure his new position in Egypt as “to counter the challenge rulers needed the help of
scholarship and religious propaganda. If, for instance, the basis of their rule could be
linked to one of the fundamentals of Islam, then their position within the Islamic
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framework needed no further justification.” 39 Ibn al-Athir’s recollections also support the
narrative of creating the continuous lineage of Sunni rule that worked to the advantage of
the religious elite. His account of Salah al-Din’s supports the narrative of strong Muslim
leaders championing the cause of reuniting Islam and consolidating a Muslim identity in
the face of the Crusaders. Hence, this notion is further emphasized by associating Salah
al-Din with Nur al-Din and displaying their piety in the administration of Egypt because
of virtuous reflection on Sunni Islam.
Although there is evidence to suggest that piety influenced the decisions that
Salah al-Din made in Egypt, his actions are more likely to have been a part of the broader
religious and political dialogue that existed. His emphasis on providing an environment
that appealed to the common man consistently disappointed the various members of his
court. Such actions reveal Salah al-Din to be someone refusing to comply with the
political game that had disrupted a collective Muslim identity in the region, working
through “sound religious instruction according to the Sunnite rules by founding colleges
and establishing approved teachers of orthodoxy in the capital and the chief provincial
towns.” 40 This type of behavior worked towards gaining the confidence of the people
because it furthered the reorientation and intensification of Sunni Islam in what
previously was a Shi’i dominated region. The connection that Salah al-Din built with the
people of Egypt as a result of implementing policies inspired by the Qur’an, such as reemphasizing Sunni interpretations of faith, allowed people to refresh their view of Islam
and demonstrated how by “sheer goodness and firmness of character, he [Salah al-Din]
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raised Islam out of the rut of political demoralization. 41 Yet, this representation of Salah
al-Din’s actions further emphasizes the role of the chronicler in constructing the pious
image of their leader. The religious dimension that had shaped the Crusaders’ actions,
and was now reciprocated by the Muslims, meant that Islam now served as the
legitimizing foundation for any leader’s actions. Therefore, the mutually beneficial
relationship developed between religious and political elites often materialized in the
creation of Islamic schools because it further propagated the political rhetoric that
leaders, such as Salah al-Din, were acting upon.
The decision to increase the Sunni Muslim presence in Egypt is perhaps
representative of Salah al-Din’s commitment to the religion during his leadership.
However, the chroniclers further bolster Salah al-Din’s relationship with Islam by
referencing two distinct moments. The first, an attempted assassination of Salah al-Din’s
life, revealed the earliest signs that he was also willing to rule with the sword when
necessary “swooping down upon the plotters, seizing the leaders, and having them all
crucified on the 6th of April, 1174.” 42 The need to supplement his generous ruling style
with that of a hard resolve endowed Salah al-Din with the qualities to become the leader
that Islam needed at the time. Following this event, Salah al-Din became deathly ill, and
it suggested that during this time he reflected upon the “fragility of human affairs, waking
him from the sleep of forgetfulness, consequently undergoing a moment of religious
awakening after which he prosecuted jihad with a genuine sense of purpose, personally as
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well as publicly.” 43 There is a tension in committing to this belief that Salah al-Din only
began to pursue jihad after these events because it can allow one to cast doubt upon the
previous actions he had undertaken as being religiously motivated. Yet, for chroniclers of
Salah al-Din, while life of introspection must have impacted his decisions, this is the
moment in which that contemplative life became a part of the public record. Such
recollections allowed the chroniclers to infuse military actions with religious fervor in
their narratives to a much greater degree, as they sought to explain and how Salah al-Din
had received a call to action against the Crusaders. Moreover, the chroniclers depicted
Salah al-Din as the perfect representative for Islam at this moment in time, because they
situate his religious awakening in the context of having a greater goal to work towards.
The result of this representation embellishes Salah al-Din’s efforts to embrace the greater
jihad, and strengthens the narrative of reorienting Sunni Islam in the face of external
threats.

Consolidating a Sunni Islamic Identity
If the commitment to his Muslim beliefs was questioned prior to embracing jihad
as a rhetorical and ideological force, through the scope of his military activities, the
chroniclers later illuminate how Salah al-Din’s military actions explicitly referenced jihad
as he fought against the Crusaders. His recognition of the historical importance of Syria
and its place as the seat of Islam refocused his military ventures towards administering
any future campaign from this region. This would also reflect upon how Salah al-Din had
truly embraced his renewed Islamic beliefs and further his cause of championing Islam.
43
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Such a concept was widely acknowledged at the time, with both Nur al-Din and Zengi
conducting their business from Aleppo and Damascus, as “from the standpoint of
religious propaganda, Egypt was part of the patrimony of Islam, a base for the Holy War
but not as convenient a one as Syria.” 44 Naturally, this prompted a response from the
rulers in Syria, the vacuum left in the aftermath of Nur al-Din’s death made an opening
that Salah al-Din could capitalize upon. However, his moves threatened elites and their
way of life and lead to claims that he was “betraying his master [Nur al-Din].” 45 Whether
these claims can truly be substantiated can only be seen via the actions that followed
Salah al-Din’s capture of such key Syrian cities, thus spending “his first decade in power
fighting fellow Muslims in order to achieve a unified base.” 46 These actions actually
prompted support from many people who saw the decline of Islam after Nur al-Din’s
death primarily as a result of individuals seeking personal rewards. This was remarked
upon by Ibn al-Athir who stated:
Amongst the rulers of Islam we see not one who desires to wage jihad or
aid the religion. Each one devotes himself to his pastimes and amusements
and wronging his flock. This is more dreadful to me than the enemy. 47
Taking into account Ibn al-Athir’s remarks actually justifies the steps Salah al-Din took
in order to unite all Muslim people. His recognition of a lack of coordination between the
various cities and why that was more important at the time than directly confronting the
Franks promotes his own foresight in the matter. Salah al-Din’s conquests at this point
indicate a resistance to indiscriminate violence because he “did not want to inflict losses
on the Aleppans as they were after all, the soldiers of the Holy War,” which was the goal
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of his endeavors in Syria, setting up a standard for jihad. 48 The resistance that Salah alDin encountered was perhaps reflective of the abyss that had been left between Islam and
religious piety and military actions. In fact Salah al-Din’s actions reinvented the
perception of how jihad could strengthen collective Muslim identities. The controlled
manner with which Salah al-Din conducted this battle, content with victory as opposed to
destroying the forces that stood against him, highlights a commitment to a greater vision
and struggle that he could see as more of a threat to Islam. Yet, the views of Salah alDin’s justified campaigns against fellow Muslims is another representation of events by
chroniclers to portray Salah al-Din as an individual capable of envisioning the more
important goals of Islam. The fact that his actions against Muslims were not explicitly
condemned by religious elites highlights how it was important for the reorientation of
Sunni Islam to have a leader capable of waging a jihad against the Crusaders. The
practical measures he took infused with religious ideals resonated with the “personal
inner renewal” he was embracing when conducting his jihad. 49 The careful process of
necessary action with tactile restraint highlighted how Salah al-Din had developed into a
capable leader, one that used using Islamic principles to inform these decisions in order
to create the united Muslim people that could engage more successfully with the Frankish
forces. Therefore, his pious religious virtue is a portrayal that resonates amongst his
contemporaries because it rationalizes a series of actions that led to the eventual retaking
of lands from the Crusaders.
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At the height of his power, Salah al-Din’s relationship with Ibn Shaddad took on
added importance because the scholar began to record Salah al-Din’s actions and
achievements and thus provided insights into the ruler’s personal life. Many of Ibn
Shaddad’s memories and experiences have been translated to reflect Salah al-Din’s
embracing of jihad and the central role it played in his conquests. Ibn Shaddad recalled
how jihad began to consume every aspect of his life stating:
The Jihad, his love and passion for it, had taken a mighty hold on his heart
and all his being, so much so that he talked of nothing else, thought of
nothing but the means to pursue it, was concerned only with its manpower
and had a fondness only for those who spoke of it and encourage it. In his
love for the Jihad on the path of God he shunned his womenfolk, his
children, his homeland, his home and all his pleasures, and for this world
he was content in the shade of his tent with the winds blowing through it
left and right. 50
It appeared to Ibn Shaddad that Salah al-Din was no longer only enamored with the
concept of jihad but had actually found his own jihad within the crusading context. By
referencing Salah al-Din’s jihad as the “The Jihad” the chronicler endorses his actions.
Such rhetoric used to characterize Salah al-Din’s ventures certainly displays the
commitment to jihad that is often referred to in the Qur’an. Thus, Ibn Shaddad’s
characterizations of Salah al-Din emphasize the leader’s role as the standard bearer for all
Muslims and provide the foundations for future generations to recognize the importance
of an individual in uniting Islam. The need to make Salah al-Din’s jihad pragmatic and an
eventual reality are highlighted through the acknowledgement of “manpower” that would
be crucial if Salah al-Din were to evict the Frankish forces from the Holy City. Yet, the
mentioning of practical realities almost undermine the spiritual conviction that resonates
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throughout the passage, with talk of Salah al-Din preferring a life of simplicity,
undeterred and unavailed by the vices that perhaps consume a man not wholly committed
to jihad. For a man of such power to reject all the worldly prizes that can be afforded to
such a position certainly highlights a greater understanding of how jihad can be
undertaken. Ibn Shaddad asserts that it is this commitment and subservience to jihad that
serves as the base of Salah al-Din’s power:
The sultan perceived that his gratitude for God’s favor towards was
evidenced by his strong grasp on sovereignty, his God-given control over
the lands and the people’s willing obedience, could only be demonstrated
by his endeavoring to exert himself to the utmost and to strive to fulfill the
precept of Jihad. 51
Ibn Shaddad sought to characterize Salah al-Din as the greatest leader of the time, and he
did this by emphasizing how people were willing to subject themselves to Salah al-Din’s
plan and become a part of this greater Islamic struggle as a result of Salah al-Din’s own
dedication to jihad. The fact that Salah al-Din, at this moment in time, had highlighted
himself as the most capable Muslim ruler as well as the most powerful perhaps left little
alternative for the people even if they wanted to object. However, it has to be
acknowledged that Salah al-Din had impacted the majority of his subjects in a positive
way, deferring to mercy upon his initial overtures in Syria as opposed to killing all of
those who had opposed him. Moreover, the fact that there was little in the way of revolts
and revolutions to Salah al-Din’s rule does paint him as a force that managed to unite the
Muslim people to some degree under the banner of jihad.

51

Ibid., 72.

Salah al-Din & Jihad | 59

Religious Piety at the Height of Salah al-Din’s Power
As the Sunni religious establishment continued to dominate the dialogue with
their connection to military rulers, the key components of this spiritual venture
materialized in both the lesser and the greater jihad. The displacement of Muslim ideals
during the period of disunity meant a resurgence of traditional interpretations of the
Qur’an and its role during the Second Crusades. Therefore, waging a united Muslim war
against the Franks was a central tenet of the lesser jihad, as crafted by the chroniclers. As
a result, Salah al-Din’s leadership position in this religious dynamic allowed him the
opportunity to pursue both types of jihad, and spread this notion to other people. Salah alDin displayed little in the way of intentionally violent or merciless tendencies, instead
emphasizing how his jihad necessitated a balance between being a firm ruler while not
forgetting the virtuous principles of Islam that also comprised an important aspect of
jihad. In his role as a supreme leader of the Muslim people, Ibn Shaddad discusses Salah
al-Din as a man and the relationship he built with his people:
Salah al-Din’s generosity was too public to need to be recorded and too
famous to need to be recounted, and yet we will give an indication of it in
general terms. He ruled all that he ruled, and, when he died, in his treasure
chest were found only 47 Nasiri dirhams of silver and a single Tyrian gold
coin. 52
Ibn Shaddad’s recollection of Salah al-Din’s pious nature during his time in the sultan’s
service is significant to our reading of jihad because it demonstrates where the
chronicler’s convictions lay when he outlines various ideals mentioned in the Qur’an
regarding jihad. Salah al-Din’s willingness to make such engagements in all of the
territories he ruled, as highlighted when Ibn Shaddad stated “he ruled all that he ruled,”
52

Ibid., 25.

Tracing Islamic Extremist Ideologies | 60

infers the depth of which Salah al-Din was truly working towards fulfilling his jihad.
Extending from the generosity Salah al-Din showed towards his own people, Ibn
Shaddad also commented on Salah al-Din’s relationship with the Crusaders stating “he
received graciously anyone that came to him on a mission, even if he were an infidel,”
revealing how Salah al-Din did not see his jihad as the extermination of all those that
opposed Muslims in the region. 53 The explicit reference by Ibn Shaddad of Salah al-Din’s
hospitality towards those on official business is perhaps indicative of a greater code of
honor that was held at those times, a tone that is consistent with many of the battles that
took place and perhaps most commonly associated with the relationship between Salah
al-Din and Richard the Lionheart. Yet, the fact that Salah al-Din did not see this code as a
direct affront to his jihad reveals the origins of the portrayals that highlight Salah al-Din’s
sense of tolerance that resonates with themes in the Qur’an and deter the unnecessary
need to constantly shed blood in the name of jihad.
Displays of tolerance by Salah al-Din, as narrated by Ibn Shaddad, have also been
corroborated in recollections by Christian chroniclers. The Christian chronicler Ernoul
who was also present during the crusades as a squire of Balian of Ibelin, an important
crusader noble in Jerusalem, witnessed the mercy of Salah al-Din in the aftermath of the
Battle of Hattin in 1187. Ernoul wrote:
Never did Salah al-Din show himself greater than during this memorable
surrender. His guards, commanded by responsible emirs, kept order in
every street, and prevented violence and insult, insomuch that no ill-usage
of the Christians was ever heard of. Of the great courtesy which Salah alDin showed to the wives and daughters of knights, who had fled to
Jerusalem when their lords were killed or made prisoners in battle. When
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these ladies were ransomed and had come forth from Jerusalem, they
assembled and went before Salah al-Din crying mercy...When Salah alDin saw them weeping, he had great compassion for them, and wept
himself for pity, And he bade the ladies who husbands were alive to tell
him where they were captives, and as soon as he could go to the prisons he
would set them free. And he gave them so much that they gave praise to
God and published abroad the kindness and honor which Salah al-Din had
done to them. 54
Ernoul’s observations corroborate the greater understanding of jihad and Islam that Ibn
Shaddad sets out in his position as judge of the army. From Ernoul’s account of Salah alDin’s behavior we can insinuate the goal of Salah al-Din’s jihad was never seeking the
extermination of Christians or the humiliation of them upon his victories. Rather Salah alDin’s jihad is firmly rooted in his ability to empathize in another person’s suffering, and
Ibn Shaddad portrays this understanding of war through the connection that Salah al-Din
made between jihad and religious piety. Moreover, Salah al-Din’s empathy went beyond
simply acting merciful to those that he conquered. He also provided them with the means
to aid in rebuilding their lives, as suggested by Ernoul and emphasized further by
secondary sources that acknowledge how “Salah al-Din showed himself worthy of
victory, treating his prisoners generously, setting them free and sending many of them
away with gifts.” 55 In accordance with Qur’anic writings, there is no suggestion that
Salah al-Din subjected his prisoners to any heinous treatment 56 and working within the
principles of war outlined in the Qur’an for correct acts jihad ensured that these women
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were acknowledged as non-participants in the war and consequently should be treated
with respect as the Qur’an teaches. Moreover, Ernoul’s statements also suggest how those
he commanded adhered to his strategy and orders thus reflecting the faith they had in
their master’s ideals and the medium through which he conducted his jihad. The fact that
there was a strict sense of discipline amongst the Muslim soldiers in such a vast army
surely means that there was a common factor or ideology keeping them so tightly bound.
As a result, the role of Salah al-Din is further emphasized in the chronicles as being
responsible for this culture developing in the Muslim forces. The fact that chroniclers
thrived during Salah al-Din’s era, further emphasizes how the lack of Muslim unity prior
to his time allowed the chronicles another opportunity to accentuate such tales individual
significance.
The manifestation of jihad, displayed through the military ventures of Salah alDin has an interesting relationship between aggressive zeal and a lack of fanaticism.
Based upon the ideas of the Qur’an, Salah al-Din was often believed to be the responder
in his wars with the Crusaders; Ibn Shaddad has recorded his lack of preference for
fighting:
Later the sultan said, I charge you to fear God Almighty, for He, is the
source of all-good. I command you to do what God has commanded, for
that he is the means of salvation. I warn you against shedding blood,
indulging in it and making a habit of it, for blood never sleeps. 57
Salah al-Din’s motivations for undertaking this jihad are not driven by bloodlust or
personal glory as represented by Ibn Shaddad, but rather suggest his level of subservience
to a higher power. Out of respect and recognition for this higher power there seems to be
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a clear need to show restraint when fighting the Crusaders, which manifests itself in his
refusal to shed blood needlessly. Moreover, Salah al-Din was consistently shown as a
leader that rarely, if at all, enacted the violence against the Crusaders. This image has
constantly been recognized in comparison to the leaders of the Crusaders such as
Reginald of Chatillon who “had won for himself an unenviable reputation as a breaker of
treaties, it was his delight to seize peaceful caravans of merchants and pilgrims on their
way into Syria from Egypt or Mekka.” 58 The infringement on Salah al-Din’s ability to
safely protect the people he had sworn responsibility to was clearly an antagonism that he
could not repeatedly tolerate. The lack of respect for Salah al-Din’s tolerance was clearly
a mentality that had permeated the Crusader’s camps as it was understood that “treaties
with soldiers of the Cross were worse than useless, so long as the doctrine prevailed in
Christendom that no faith need be kept with the infidel.” 59 The sense of religious
animosity was one that was capitalized upon by the leaders of the West, invoking a
fighting spirit that encouraged aggression against the enemy, yet, was not wholly
reciprocated by Salah al-Din. In fact this Christian fanaticism was encouraged to the
point that it created an atmosphere of mistrust in the Crusader’s camps with the
“Christian sects having less to fear from the generous Salah al-Din than from the rapacity
and tyranny of their Christian masters, to whom heresy was almost as hateful as Islam
itself.” 60 The difference in control that each side had imposed upon their armies’ marks a
clearly delineated line in the culture and aims that these camps were derived from. With
Salah al-Din seeing beyond the short term idea of a war against Christianity to a greater
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purpose or struggle that his jihad demanded, leading to a more balanced ideology
implemented and adhered to by his army. Constantly seeking an alternative to war when
one was available, even when it meant the release of key prisoners, his efforts were not
returned equally, highlighted by the release of Guy of Lusignan in 1188 who “had
promised not to bear arms against Salah al-Din, yet, in August 1189, he resumed the
offensive.” 61 Ibn Shaddad’s representations of Salah al-Din as the champion of Islam
lead him to place greater emphasis on the ways in which the leader’s actions corroborate
the teachings of the Qur’an. Therefore, displays of the Crusaders as the aggressors further
the notion of Salah al-Din’s pious character.
The consensus amongst the historians and scholars at the time seems to echo the
idea that regardless of how much jihad and Islam motivated Salah al-Din’s action, it was,
at the very least, a factor that had to be considered as occupying a central space in the
sultan’s life. The fact that Salah al-Din prided himself on living a virtuous life is often
believed to be categorical of his behavior, separate from how he ruled his people as
suggested that “in his personal life, which was seen by only a handful of followers, where
he is seen to be pious and God-fearing, which was extended by Ibn Shaddad into his role
as ruler.” 62 Were Ibn Shaddad alone in his claims of the impact of jihad upon Salah alDin’s life, there would certainly be a greater level of skepticism directed towards both the
scholar and Salah al-Din, yet, Ibn al-Athir also suggests this was the case when he
explicitly stated:
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The testimony of others and outsiders satisfactorily corroborates the
statements of those close to Salah al-Din. 63
The belief that Salah al-Din would remain a perfect picture of Islamic and jihad practices
is an idealistic framework that any person would struggle to live up to. Yet, the fact that
Salah al-Din simply sought to incorporate and interpret the Qur’an as frequently as
possible into all aspects of his life, both personally and publicly, suggests that it was the
most honest representation of his religion and led to his recognition as such an
irreproachable leader. The extent that this was seen across the Muslim and Christian
divide with the common belief that his “moral superiority over his contemporary peers
was acknowledged in his own lifetime by his enemies, the Crusaders; his image, even
amidst the anti-Muslim bigotry of the European Middle Ages, remained unsullied, even
romanticized, and that at a time when Europe’s attitude towards Islam was a sorry
mixture of ignorance and hostility.” 64 It is with little doubt that this moral code, derived
from his understanding of appropriate warfare and jihad, that Salah al-Din strictly
adhered to, was a factor that was absent in the opposing camp and perhaps led to the
constant discord that plagued the Crusaders. The acknowledgement of this tension by
observers in the crusading camps is attributed to a lack of cohesion amongst the leaders
and their soldiers as remarked upon by William of Tyre:
For five days the Christian army lay motionless, whilst their leaders were
wrangling amongst themselves united only in one purpose, to defy the
authority of Lusignan. 65
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The relationship between such dissent in the Crusading camps and the harmony in the
Muslim camps has been regularly allocated to Salah al-Din’s rule. Thus, answering the
question of what was so unique or special about his rule that was able to create such unity
amongst the Muslims can be accredited with the reorientation of Sunni Islam that Salah
al-din played a central role in creating. The impact of this spirit can be fully recognized in
the aftermath of Salah al-Din’s time when “the charismatic leader had gone and the
perfect focus provided for jihad in Salah al-Din’s time, was no longer a common will
amongst the Ayyubid elite.” 66 The belief that it was not just jihad that had created a sense
of unity amongst all the Muslim people but rather the way that Salah al-Din practiced his
jihad, which trickled into every part of society and became a reflection of how Islam
should bring such tolerance and respect to those that have such belief.
The narrative of Salah al-Din attempts to portray a connection of an individual
and his faith in perhaps its purest form since the time of the Prophet Muhammad. The
significance of such a portrayal is emblematic of the larger period of time where Sunni
Islam was recovering from a period of flux and disunity. Therefore, the consequent
portrayals of Salah al-Din as the champion of Islam and his ability to thwart the external
Crusading adversaries takes on added impetus in consolidating a strong identity for Sunni
Islam. Thus, the way in which the chroniclers represented Salah al-Din is a unique
medium that acted as a way for Muslims to overcome obstacles to their faith. Such a
representation perhaps overstates the role of jihad and Islam in Salah al-Din’s life as we
accept that it can be argued that this was personal ambition that prompted the ensuing
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events. 67 However, for future generations Salah al-Din’s monumental actions, as
represented by the Muslim chroniclers, highlight a certain moral standard that all
Muslims should strive towards. The consequences of this belief manifest themselves
today in how many religious and political factions, such as Hamas and the Muslim
Brotherhood, refer to Salah al-Din and the crusading context in order to emphasize the
necessity for a leader capable of unifying Islam in the face of mounting external threats.
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III
The Ottoman Empire & Jihad: Realigning Religious Doctrine & the
Rise of Competing Muslim Empires

T

he legacy of Salah al-Din and the Crusades impacted the historical
narrative and usage of jihad ideology in a way that popularized and

legitimized the concept to the extent that it became the primary framework for conquest
and expansion. In the fragmented medieval world, the sanctuary of religious doctrine led
leaders to “reduce obedience to God’s will to the precise prescriptions of codified sacred
law.” 1 In the wake of Mongol invasions in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, new
empires emerged that redefined geographical space through a renewed expansionary
ethos. 2 In part, new early modern dynasties emerged due to the inability of crusading
mentalities, following Salah al-Din’s initial success, to secure a consolidated Muslim
identity, which led to political fragmentation. Such issues created a splintering in the
various factions of the Muslim community and created an opportunity for another empire
to be built, with “rival sects and rival states dividing the community of the faithful.” 3
New political theologies concerning the relationship between religion and political power
shifted conquest from spiritual dictates to conquest for wealth and territory. As these
political shifts occurred, they were accompanied by changes in economic forces, social
upheaval and the apocalyptic sentiment that coalesced into a period of major upheaval
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across Anatolia into the Arab provinces. 4 As a result, the early modern period can be
characterized as a sustained movement from local fragmentation to political consolidation
that culminated in the long-standing power of the Ottoman Empire. 5 With the vacuum
available and ripe for the ascension of a new empire, the Ottomans hovered
“optimistically around the possibility of re-ordering of the known world.” 6 Thus, this
chapter addresses the dynamism of the Ottoman Empire that pivoted on ultimate loyalty
to the Sultans and their ability to create a political force that could confront and conquer
Muslim as well as non-Muslim entities.
The reigns of Sultan Selim I and Sultan Sϋleyman epitomize this behavior as,
throughout their tenure, they sought to wage a war against their neighbor while
reconciling it with Islamic doctrine. Letter exchanges between Sultan Selim and his Shi’i
counterpart, Shah Isma’il, highlight the different styles of each imperial order and give us
an insight into how the Sultan tried to claim greater devotion to Islam and privilege his
position as caretaker of the Muslim community. The study of Sultan Selim’s reign will
also bring into focus the role of the Mamluks, another Sunni Muslim regime that the
Ottomans overcame on their way to becoming supreme defenders of the religions. The
significance of this conquest is unparalleled because it brought the holy cities of Mecca
and Medina into the Ottoman fold and added greater purpose and credibility to their
cause in later conflicts with the Safavids. During Sultan Sϋleyman’s reign a closer look
must also be taken at the relationship between the religious institutes, the palace, and one
of the most prominent jurists and Qur’an exegetes, Ebussuud Efendi, who effectively
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reorganized the connection between the sultan and Islam without undermining the
former’s power in the empire. Lastly, the reforms proposed by a seventeenth-century
Ottoman statesman, Aziz Efendi, will explore a suggestion for a public policy through the
regulation of the Kurdish regions of the Empire, and their relevance as a buffer zone
against the Safavid regime.
Foregrounding Ottoman imperial history highlights a particular set of governing
practices that balanced Islamic ideals with practical realities. The intertwining of
religious doctrine with territorial expansion as well domestic politics created a unique
paradigm that led to the redefinition of Islam and of Muslim unity under the various
sultans. While previous Muslim-based empires engaged in an almost binary policy of
dealing with non-Muslim elements, the Ottomans recognized that the stability of their
empire often depended on various degrees of tolerance crucial to maintaining law and
order. Thus, this chapter shall examine various aspects of Ottoman law and explore how
an unquestionable bond of loyalty to the sultan became the basis of Ottoman strength.
This was achieved by hinging every aspect of public policy on the word of the sultan,
which, then fostered a relationship between religious institutes and authorities and the
palace that would then work harmoniously towards propagating a loyal demographic
while preaching Muslim ideals at the same time. 7 Such a relationship would become
central when the Ottomans went to war with their Muslim neighbors, the Safavids and the
Mamluks, as it provided a series of novel justifications that had not been seen before in
Islamic governing parlance. The legal tradition that emerged during the Ottoman years
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allowed for non-Muslims to inhabit territories in the Ottoman Empire as well as in the
ranks of government. The Ottoman mechanism for dealing with non-Muslim “peoples of
the book” was enshrined in the early efforts of Muhammad to define social relations in
Medina, and then used by every Muslim-based ruling establishment since. The Ottomans
perfected this system, and made it applicable to ruling across a larger expanse. The shift
in Muslim mentality that led to a large and diverse empire can be seen as a natural
progression for a government seeking to maintain control. Thus, examining how the
mechanics of the empire functioned through the relationship between religious bodies
and the sultan, governance of the Kurdish people and war with their Muslim neighbors
can cast a light on how the Ottoman Empire reached an unprecedented size and stature.

Seyh Bedreddin and the Emerging Ottoman Empire
Part of the reason the Ottoman Empire had achieved such success in their gradual
ascension to power was due to its “openness to negotiation with social groups that cleared
the way for agreement and compromise, even if it was temporary.” 8 However, after the
reconsolidation of the dynasty in the mid-fifteenth century, new strategies for alignment
emerged. These can be fully explored within the context of a key revolt, led by the Seyh
Bedreddin who came to represent large heterogeneous elements that had propelled the
Ottomans to their initial success. The Ottoman Empire emerged from a severely
fragmented Anatolian context. It was one of 16 small principalities that divided the
territory after the collapse of Seljuk rule, and gradually created a following in battles
against rivals and against the might of the Byzantine Empire. From 1299 to 1402,
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Bayezid raised one of the largest armies in the known world until these forces were
defeated by a rival imperial coalition, the neo-Mongol patrilineage of Timur Leng. 9 This
conquest would be short lived, and by the 1420s the Ottomans would surge back to
prominence and Timur’s disbanded forces would re-unite in the Deccan Plateau, to found
the Mughal Empire.
The tensions between Seyh Bedreddin and the emerging Ottoman regime set a
precedent for how notions of territorial sovereignty and mechanisms for allegiances to an
imperial hierarchy were changing. Bedreddin was a well-travelled and well-educated
theologian whose diverse background, with a Turkish-speaking father who had studied
Jewish jurisprudential traditions and a Greek mother, meant that his broad understanding
of different cultures and people could be seen as a threat to an order that was trying to
capitalize on the empty political vacuum in the region. His constant preaching of “oral,
popular and localized culture,” was an attempt to reconnect with the “peasant-nomadic”
background of people in the area. 10 It may seem ironic that an empire that had Christian
and Jewish inhabitants would take such staunch offence to the work of a preacher, but
their reasons lie in multiple elements of his preaching. In fact, the Ottomans in their vast
empire had usefully deployed a lot of what Bedreddin represented, such as syncretic Sufi
and Islamic practices and an emphasis on mystic elements more generally. Yet, his
actions in the “rebellious context,” following a period of chaos in the wake of Timur’s
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victories, demonstrated how these ideals could become a threat to the regime and were
ultimately why his actions engaged a state response. 11
This rebellious context arose from the fact that Bedreddin was not willing to work
within a system that shifted from gathering all participants in an imperial quest to one
that sought to control the extent of such political and cultural diversity, thus “Bedreddin
represents a moment when the Ottomans were maneuvering out of the unrestrained
mystical diversity to a more controlled order of state-policed orthodoxy.” 12 Bedreddin’s
refusal to pay the high taxes demanded by the local representatives of the central
Ottoman government displays a counter attack on the shift towards a consolidated
Ottoman Empire that the government was trying to achieve. The fact that the Ottoman
Empire had not yet achieved a sense of formal orthodoxy and established policy
represents how a “state on the way to consolidation wanted order and legibility” before it
could begin to address heretics more even-handedly. 13 Bedreddin’s rebellion can be seen
as a transitional moment in the region between acceptance and dissent and the historical
shift from syncretism to rigid hegemony that shapes an “understanding of imperial
longevity.” 14 The openness that Bedreddin fought for was a model of the past, one that
thrived in the vacant power vacuum, yet, upon the rise of the Ottoman Empire it was
clear that the kind of life he led was becoming marginalized in favor of a more rigid and
legible social order. 15 This moment during the fifteenth century categorizes changing
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concepts of frontier empires and a consolidated identity that needed to precede the
extensive eventual aims of territorial conquest the Ottomans adopted.

The True Defenders of Islam: Establishing Ottoman Religious Credibility
After the establishment of the Ottoman Empire, its biggest challenge became
keeping control and credibility of the rulers in all aspects of their lives. With regards to
conquest against non-Muslim entities and forays into Europe, Ottoman rhetoric was not
vastly different from its predecessors; yet, the new challenge came in trying to expand
into Muslim dominated areas. This has been most evident with the rise of the Safavids
and Shi’i Islam, a new constellation of empire and religion that had also amassed a
significant amount of support and existed in close proximity to the Ottomans. Prior to the
rise of the Safavid state the Ottoman’s “true organizing principle was loyalty to the
Ottoman dynasty,” a facet of the empire that grew as it “gradually accumulated a
charisma of success.” 16 The fact that a credible, united Islamic threat to the Sunni elite
did not exist prior to the Safavids meant that religion did not occupy the dominant space
when motivating territorial expansion. Instead, the Ottomans were “primarily motivated
by the desire to conquer wealthy territories,” which had predominantly prevented them
from being overly antagonistic towards non-Muslim communities that became a part of
the Empire. 17 However, the rise of their Shi’i neighbors prompted a reevaluation of
public policy and expansionist doctrine, which as the conflicts became more intense,
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emphasized the Ottomans own devotion to Sunni Islam. 18 This would become a strong
tenant in forging the bond between the palace and the religious establishment in the
Ottoman Empire because it allowed an avenue where loyalty to the sultan was
maintained, while bolstering a commitment to Islam. The process of codifying these ideas
into a dynamic interaction between dynastic and Islamic law can be traced throughout the
reigns of Sultan Selim I and Sultan Sϋleyman the Magnificent or Law-Giver. These
relationships set a tone that would legitimize a new type of war against fellow Muslims
and demonstrates the shifting notion of jihad and warfare in the early modern period.
The fact that the Ottoman Empire had risen to such heights on their ability to
wage successful campaigns meant that the sultan’s role as a leader in war was enough to
legitimize his rule. 19 This was especially true in conquests westward towards Europe,
where united forces sought to pit Christianity against Islam in a post-Crusades world. The
legitimizing process began with referencing the sultans as ghazis, a word which has an
everyday sense of “warrior” or “raider” but which, when Islamic jurists and historians
adopted it as one of the terms for a person engaged in holy war, also acquired the sense of
“holy warrior.” 20 The intertwining of the warrior and his actions against non-believers in
the frontier gathered elements of Ottoman Turkish folklore and contributed to a new
strand of literature dedicated to questions of jihad. 21 This literature came to shape the
ethos of the Ottoman ruling dynasty, and became a part of how history and rhetoric
shaped the legitimacy of its rule. However, reconciling this rhetoric when combatting
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fellow Muslims was a new challenge that had not previously been seen before and several
justifications were propagated to maintain the credibility of both the sultan and the
Ottoman Empire. In the fifteenth century, the early years of the Ottoman regime,
chroniclers presented Muslim adversaries of the Ottomans as hindering the holy war, in
essence questioning their devotion to Islam as a whole. 22 This technique also included
accusations of how the actions of these Muslim communities led to the oppression of
other Muslims, “thus making the removal of oppression obligatory for the Ottomans.” 23
Conflating longer tales of history between Osman and his father, Ertugrul, and the
Seljuks, which worked towards proving Ottoman claims of imperial legitimacy,
supplemented these actions. 24
The spurious nature of the genealogical proofs that Ottoman historians were
continuously creating allowed them to navigate the fifteenth century relatively
unchallenged by their Muslim neighbors, yet, the rise of the Safavids saw the
replacement of these proofs with newer reasoning adduced from the canonical texts of
Islam. The nature of Shi’i Islam that the Safavids practiced was underpinned by their
quasi-divine status, which allowed the Ottomans to present the Safavids as rebels against
the legitimate authority of the Ottoman sultans and, more importantly, “as apostates and
infidels.” 25 Thus, from the early sixteenth century, as a response to the preaching of Shah
Isma’il and the establishment of the Safavid order, the Ottomans were able to portray
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their Sultan as the sole legitimate defender of the holy law and to claim “that their rule
was a precondition to its coming into effect.” 26

Muslim Rivalries: Letter Exchanges between Selim I and Shah Isma’il
Initial confrontations with the Safavids and their ruler Shah Isma’il began during
the reign of Sultan Selim I and after the 1502 establishment of the Safavid real. His reign
from 1512-1520 sparked early concerns of how to deal with an empire that drew its
power base from “religious sanctity.” 27 While the Ottoman government gradually coopted the religious establishment, in the Safavid regime, religious ideals were the central
factor in creating a legitimate government. The rise of Isma’il and his consequent success
depended on his followers’ belief in his descent from Muhammad’s son-in-law Ali which
made him the only legitimate successor to the Prophet. 28 Such a doctrine was a danger for
the Ottomans, as this new ideology attracted those whose religious and political beliefs
were poorly-defined and who saw little place for themselves in the centralized Ottoman
regime “being built on the ruins of other Anatolian emirates which once seemed equally
viable.” 29 Moreover, this claim was problematic for the Ottomans and Sultan Selim as it
meant they, and all other Muslim rulers, were usurpers. Sultan Selim certainly tried to
quell any form of support for the Safavids in his territories, resorting to force when
necessary against those who sympathized with Shah Isma’il. 30 However, the only way
that he could directly come into conflict with the ruler of the Safavids, while preserving
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his own religious and political credibility, was through a religious justification. 31 Such
actions also brought him into direct contact with the Shah, and letter exchanges between
the two leaders provide insight into what each person deemed important in legitimizing
their claim to serve as the temporal leader of the Muslim community. Moreover, the
relationship between the Ottomans and other Muslim leaders such as the Mamluks also
shows how the inter-imperial conflict proved opportunistic for the Ottomans and allowed
Sultan Selim to ultimately capture the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.
In letters exchanged between Selim and Isma’il, the Sultan set out to defend his
right to rule by quoting from the Qur’an and alluding to examples of history that further
legitimized his claims. Yet his counterpart, the Safavid Shah, perhaps based on his
genealogical claims, felt no such need to quote from the Qur’an or to make counter
claims from history. Instead, Isma’il quotes from “seemingly contemporary Persian
poetry” and appears to simply dismiss Selim’s arguments. 32 Sultan Selim begins the
defense of his empire and his claims to lead the Muslim people by quoting from the
Qur’an:
This is a Scripture We have sent down, blessed; so follow it, and be god
fearing; haply so you will find mercy. 33
In trying to set a precedent that Shi’i Islam had complete diverted from the Qur’an and
constituted a heretical movement, Selim aimed to eliminate any fundamental historical
evidence that supported the claims of Shah Isma’il and his relationship with the Prophet.
Not only did Selim undermine Isma’il’s claims to legitimate rule, but he also portrayed
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the Shah as committing a grave sin against Islam and consequently asks him to repent.
The Sultan supports his argument by quoting the Shah’s own words and his suggestion
that the Qur’an constituted the myth of the Ancients, therefore stating that any
justifications made on the text were certainly fallible. 34 The Sultan argues that the image
crafted by the Shah suggests he is above the rule of Islam. Selim, by contrast, possesses
the appropriate humility to a divine power, which thus legitimates his position as a ruler.
Selim follows these claims by suggesting that Ottoman success is due to the fact that their
campaigns have been religiously justified and that all their enemies formed elements of
anti-Muslim entities:
We who are the Caliph of God Most High in this world, far and wide; the
proof of the verse what profits man is haloed in victory, Faridun
triumphant; slayer of the wicked and the infidel. 35
Here Sultan Selim asserts his own right to serve as the civil and religious leader of the
Muslim world and grounding that idea in the claim that their expansion would not have
been as successful if it were not sanctified by a higher power. The tactic of branding all
enemies of the Ottoman Empire, to this date, as “infidels” furthers Selim’s claims that his
actions were morally sound in the name of Islam. The letters also imply that Selim is not
yet at the point of taking up arms against the Safavids, an idea that is later substantiated
when he asks instead for fealty from the Safavids and states that they will be granted
“royal favor and imperial patronage” in return. 36 This reluctance to shed Muslim blood is
perhaps representative of a broader problem in framing such actions with sanctioned
religious pretexts. For the Ottomans to truly present themselves as defenders of the
34
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Islamic faith, their actions against fellow Muslims would require more support from
religious institutions, support that had not yet been necessarily provided.
Sultan Selim thus opts for another tactic. His verbal attacks distinguish between
religious and cultural differences of the people ruled by Shah Isma’il:
Addressed to the ruler of the Persians, the possessor of the land of tyranny
and perversion. You have incited your abominable Shi’i faction to
unsanctified sexual union and to the shedding of innocent blood. 37
Selim thus distinguished between Muslim and Persian communities. The distinction is
key because it provides a justification for Selim to wage war against the Safavids, as it is
no longer a battle against fellow Muslims but a campaign against a cultural other. This
theme is further substantiated when Selim calls Shah Isma’il a tyrannical ruler, thus
meaning that it is Selim’s obligation to free those burdened by the Shah’s rule and bring
them into the Sunni Islamic fold. The emphasis on the fact that Shi’i Islam is exclusively
Shah Isma’il’s brainchild is also important, because if the two sides were to engage
militarily, the deposition of Shah Isma’il would end the conflict and prevent Selim from
shedding more Muslim blood. This idea is amplified in the last line where Selim
attributes ownership of the Shi’i faction to Isma’il and associates the killings of other
Muslims upon his shoulders. The need to consistently re-emphasize this theme is a
central part of providing as many justifications for both waging a war against the Shi’is
and further legitimizing the Ottoman Sultanate. If Selim could show that the Shah’s
practice of Islam was a departure from the “path of true Islam” then it was possible that
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he could attain the expressed opinion from the religious elites to justify his actions
against the Safavids. 38
The response of Shah Isma’il also warrants a closer look as it contains veiled
threats as well as phrases that commend the Ottoman Empire. The way in which Shah
Isma’il addresses Sultan Selim to begin with is peculiar and striking:
May his godly majesty, the refuge of Islam, the might of the kingdom, he
upon whom god looks with favor, the champion of the sultanate and of the
state, the hero of the faith and of the earth, Sultan Selim Shah. 39
The apparent respect that Shah Isma’il affords to his counterpart is never reciprocated by
the Sultan and begs the question as to why the Shah would resort to such kind words.
They suggest a posture of cunning, and a willingness to engage in competitive, witty
exchanges that showcase his literary talents and religious training. The feigned ignorance
of the impending threats from the Ottomans is continued in the Shah’s response when he
addresses to the antagonisms in the Sultan’s letter:
Their [Sultan’s letter] contents, although indicative of hostility, are stated
with boldness and vigor. The latter gives us much enjoyment and pleasure,
but we are ignorant of the reason for the former...We have always loved
the gazi-titled Ottoman house we do not wish the outbreak of sedition and
turmoil once again as in the time of Timur. 40
The subtle defense of no wrongdoing taking place in the Safavid regime is under the
guise of acknowledging the Ottoman’s as the worthy defenders of Islam, and a
willingness to recognize their title of “holy warriors.” The reverence that the Safavids
possessed towards the Ottomans was not an uncommon theme in their history, as many

38

Finkel., 104.
McNeill., 342.
40
Ibid., 343.
39

Tracing Islamic Extremist Ideologies | 82

Safavid chroniclers refer to the Ottomans “as a bastion of Islam in the face of European
unbelief.” 41 Such a defense places the onus upon the Ottomans to further justify their
hostile claims, especially when the Safavids attempted to assert peaceful relations with
their neighbors. While the responses of the Shah are complex, he does make clear that if
the Ottomans continue their aggressive rhetoric or take action on their verbal threats, then
the Safavids will not hesitate to respond in kind:
If political necessity has compelled you on this course, then may your
problems soon be solved. In all friendship we say do what you will. Bitter
experiences has taught us that in this world of trial He who falls upon the
house of Ali always falls. When war becomes inevitable, hesitation and
delay must be set aside, and one must think on that which is to come. 42
In these last few lines, the intentions and aims of the Shah become visible. The first idea
that the Shah communicates is that the Ottoman’s threatened campaigns has no religious
ground and is born out of political need. From this moment the Shah removes all
credibility from Ottoman propaganda, as he does not deem the foundations of leadership
espoused by the Sultan to be legitimate. The directness of the Shah’s words is a clear
departure from the rhetoric that comprised the rest of his response to Sultan Selim. The
Shah boldly claims that any campaign against the Safavids is doomed to fail, as all other
attempts in the past have failed to abolish the house of Ali. He ends his message with an
acknowledgement of the foregone conclusion that the Ottomans will not heed the Shah’s
warning but will most likely act upon their neighbors, and that this will potentially
transform the dynamic between the two empires and set them on a path from which there
can be no retreat.
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As the Ottomans searched for religious justifications for their antagonisms with
the Shah, they also found themselves in a unique predicament that potentially required
action against the Mamluk order. This was an even greater challenge, as the Mamluks
were also Sunni Muslims. The Mamluks, a dynasty ruling from Egypt that controlled
Palestine, Syria, Iraq and the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, could scarcely be branded
as heretics by the Ottomans “even in the interests of Ottoman realpolitik,” therefore a
campaign against them was harder to justify than one against the Safavids. 43 Yet, an
opportunity arose when the Mamluk Sultan Qansawh al-Ghawri, hoping to keep his
options open, refused to participate in an alliance with Selim against Isma’il. After Selim
captured Çaldiran in 1516 44, he declined to enter into a pact with Isma’il against the
Ottomans. 45 Neutrality was an interesting option for the Mamluks but one that set the
foundations for the Ottomans to attack their Sunni neighbors, as the nature of the conflict
between the Ottomans and Safavids required absolute commitment to a particular Muslim
ruling faction. In the eyes of the Ottomans, choosing not to side with fellow Sunnis, made
you as guilty as those actively fighting the Ottomans. Therefore, the Ottoman religious
establishment agreed to support a campaign against the Mamluks on the grounds “that
[those] who aids a heretic is himself a heretic, and that to do battle against them might be
considered a holy war.” 46 The significance of the religious cities played a role in how
such a justification was allowed to pass through the religious institutes without serious
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rebuke, as victory over the Mamluks made Selim “guardian of the Holy Places of Mecca
and Medina and guarantor of the pilgrimage routes by which the Muslim faithful had
travelled to sites associated with the life of Prophet Muhammad.” 47 The addition of these
titles to the ruler of the Ottoman Empire added a significant amount of credibility to the
role of the Ottomans in Islamic history and provided more leeway in future expansionist
policies in the name of religion. The justifications provided by the religious elites to the
Ottoman ruler, from this point onward, suggest a major reconfiguring of Muslim identity
as both territorial and ideological threats were deemed serious enough to warrant
reexaminations of Islam in order to find the appropriate pretexts for action. This
relationship would be further formalized under Selim’s successor, Sϋleyman and his
seyhϋlislam (head juris consult), Ebussuud Efendi.

God on Earth: Reordering the Ottoman Hierarchy
Selim I’s conquest enfolded former Mamluk territories into the Ottoman domain,
and for the first time the Empire possessed a majority Muslim population. The conflicts
with the Safavids, and the conquest of Mamluk territories had both contributed to a new
focus on religious orthodoxy within the palace administration. Thus, at the ascension of
Sultan Sϋleyman I, after the death of his father, a formalization of the relationship
between religious and imperial authority became a major component of the Sultan’s
agenda. The need for Sϋleyman to consolidate the dynasty’s centralized control became
an urgent priority, despite the fact that the Ottomans were now guardians of the two holy
cities with their successful victory over the Mamluks, as they had not fully defeated their
47
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Safavid neighbors. Furthermore, despite the conquests, opposition from other Muslim
legal orders and regional religious establishments still posed a problem for consolidated
rule. Thus, the incorporation of these new realms into centralized Ottoman control
required in the first place “a historical justification for Ottoman claims to pre-eminence
among Islamic sovereigns.” 48 It was fortunate that this need arose when the ulema
(religious scholars) had come to dominate the intellectual life of the Empire, and the
result was a “reformulation of Ottoman claims to legitimacy in terms of orthodox,
canonical Islam.” 49
The ulemas established the “Ottoman sultan as the absolute ruler.” 50 The change
in this dynamic, which had now been codified, allowed Sϋleyman to exercise centralized
power over the broad expanse of the empire as demonstrated by the ability of “his
officials to carry out land registration in European, Arab and Anatolian regions.” 51
Examples of this became prevalent when passages from the Qur’an were purposefully
attributed to the role of the Ottomans in the history of Islam:
God will bring a people whom He loves and who love Him, humble
towards believers, but mighty towards the infidels, fighting in the path of
God and fearing no one. 52
The “people” in the ulemas exegesis was the Ottoman dynasty, thus their acquisition of
the two holy cities was scripted according to the Qur’an. In propagating this idea it
provided a sense of prophetic meaning to the venture of the Ottoman Empire, as
everything they were doing had not fulfilled the edicts of the faith itself. When justifying
48
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the Ottoman’s campaign to conquer Mecca and Medina from the Mamluks, this claim
prompted a wider change in the Ottoman government that led to redefining administrative
practices in canonical terms. This process was pioneered by Ebussuud Efendi, the
seyhϋlislam or the highest ranked person of the ulemas appointed by royal warrant. He
created an “image of the Ottoman sultan as a truly orthodox sovereign whose rule was in
effect identical with the shari’a.” 53 Upon confirming the new Sultan, another duty of the
seyhϋlislam, Ebussuud gave Sϋleyman the title of “the one who makes manifest the
exalted word,” implying that the Sultan has almost divine status, as it is through him that
God’s orders become known to the people. 54 This reinforced the role of the ruler as being
an absolute ruler, for now any disobedience expressed towards him would be a direct
affront to the word of God, both deemed intolerable in the centralized Ottoman order.
Thus, the process began of reconciling the shari’a with the governing structures
of the Ottoman Empire. Under the new centralized order there was little room for
multiple forms of legal opinion, therefore identifying a connection that could unite all of
these processes and legitimating authorities was an essential aspect of Sultan Sϋleyman’s
reign. While this was often an assumed aspect of the Ottoman Empire, the size and
diversity that had emerged through expansionism meant, “an inevitable corollary was a
legal pluralism.” 55 The fact that the Ottomans remember Sϋleyman as the “Law-Giver” as
opposed to the title “Magnificent,” that dominates western chronicles, suggests that “it
was above all the legal order of his reign that was recreated.” 56 During his tenure as
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seyhϋlislam, the relationship between Sϋleyman and Ebussuud materialized into an
unparalleled administrative force for the empire as “what gave Ottoman legal practice its
unity was the authority of the Sultan.” 57 This became true regardless of the confessional
differences and distinct legal school, as all were recognized by “virtue of appointment by
the Sultan.” 58 It was Ebussuud who codified this process and streamlined all religious
authority through the Sultan in order to create an image of an all-encompassing leader
who had political and spiritual endorsements for his actions.
Ebussuud achieved this by creating a religious hierarchy that positioned Sϋleyman
as the leader and appointer of all those who make legal pronouncements. This created a
new norm of legal sovereignty, and jihad too became more inextricably linked to the
relationships drawn between imperial, legal, and religious authority and to the edicts of
appointed jurists. 59 Their actions were no longer autonomous from the authority of the
sultan, as Ottoman practices were based upon the Hanafi tradition, which associated a
legitimate authority with the person that “successfully seizes and holds power.” 60 This
idea became the foothold that provided the ruler with his power base that would hold
throughout his various territories because “from him the judges acquire their authority”
meaning that all implementations of the law were, in theory, an extension of the sultan’s
will. 61 Key to the reorganization of the religious hierarchy was the emergence of an elitist
cadre of ulemas, deriving from this system of centralized power. The strengthening of the
sultan’s position came through the constant dissemination of these ulemas from the center
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of the empire outwards to the more distant territories. Thus, with this model in place the
jurists in their various regions did not have to provide sufficient justification for their
rulings or concern themselves with Sϋleyman’s will as their actions had already been
justified. Upon the expansion of the Ottoman Empire, the jurists’ role was reconciling the
“legal status of persons, land and taxation in an Islamic sovereignty,” and to do so they
deployed legal opinions concerning the role of jihad in defining relations with conquered
territories. 62 The fact that Sϋleyman and his predecessors had always rationalized their
conquests with the jihad ideology meant that their new acquisitions were subjected to the
“specific rules of warfare” formulated by the jurists. 63 As a result of the jurists’
appointment by the sultan, these rules were not seen as undermining his authority or
independent of the sultan’s rule, but were rather aligned with both the ideological and
strategic goals of the Empire. The fact that religiously justified warfare and its conduct
“has a central position in the general structure of Hanafi law,” also determined the legal
status of individuals, of land and taxation, and legitimized an Empire that contained a
diverse range of ethnicities and religions. 64 The tradition adopted by the Ottomans to
replace the poll tax with threats of forceful conquest of conversion ensured that they
could both wage jihad against the “infidel” while minimizing the amount of bloodshed
such campaigns might normally entail. The overarching system that Ebussuud sought to
establish was a religiously and politically sound government with roots in Islamic
tradition effectively ensuring the tactical ability to regulate such a large empire. The
former was especially crucial during the reign of Sϋleyman I, due to the increasing threat
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of the Safavid Empire, where little incentive was needed for the Shi’i faction to question
the religious legitimacy of the Ottoman order.
For this Ottoman administration and regulatory body to exist, Ebussuud also had
to reorder the hierarchy in the Empire so that the Sultan was undeniably the ruler of the
people and, perhaps even more importantly, an extension of the Prophet and God. This
process was initiated through the Hanafi theory of ruler ship that through its legal
definition gave the sultan absolute power via successful conquests into new regions. Yet,
this legal definition was built upon the fact that religious precepts stated the sultan was
the leader of the holy wars and heir to the Seljuk dynasty, meaning that all the lands he
conquered, regardless of whether they were Christian or Muslim had already been
legitimized. 65 This rhetoric was amplified after the acquisition of the two holy cities,
which reenergized the Ottoman campaign against the “heretical” Safavids as the sultans
were now presented as defenders of the shari’a and Islam, of which neither could survive
without the Ottoman dynasty’s active protection. 66 Ebussuud formalized Sϋleyman’s
embodiment of this idea when he gave him the title of “Law-Giver,” and inscripted it
onto the Sϋleymaniye Mosque, with the words “as Caliph, he is both the interpreter and
executor of God’s Law and possessor of the kingdom’s of the world.” 67
The need to build the idea of Sϋleyman as the leader of Islam served the more
abstract purpose of winning the ideological battle with the Safavids; yet, it was not the
motivating factor that drove the army to fight for their leader, as it was during Salah al-
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Din’s reign. Instead, military service to the sultan “was a contractual obligation” that
differentiated between taxpayers and non-taxpayers as opposed to Muslim and nonMuslim. 68 This is a significant distinction to make because it highlighted how the
relationship between the palace and the religious elites had created a structure of
government that allowed the Ottomans to portray themselves as the defenders of Islam,
while having non-Muslim entities involved in the army. The reconciliation of practical
administration and ideological rhetoric is a crucial turning point in the mechanics of a
Muslim empire as it facilitated holy war rhetoric as a medium for broader justifications of
Ottoman actions. This internal sense of tolerance that was a norm in the Ottoman Empire
was consistently rationalized by the work of Ebussuud and his peers, which prompted
little backlash from the Sultan as it gave him greater freedom to pursue his politics.

Regional Challenges and Pragmatic Policies
The triumphs of Sϋleyman and his chief juris consult Ebussuud may have crafted
a new legal and imperial framework for the authority of the sultan, but it could not
preserve the Empire from continued regional challenges and external threats. These
would reach a climax in the early to mid-seventeenth century, when shifts in global trade
and new imperial powers transformed the Atlantic Ocean into a dramatic challenge to
Ottoman sovereignty. Ottoman reformers became intent on creating strategies to
reinforce the power of the Empire, and these addressed both regional and ideological
challenges in a new mode.
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Aziz Efendi, a seventeenth-century Ottoman statesman, highlighted the need for
practical domestic policies in the face of these new challenges. He explicitly made these
points concerning revived threats along the Safavid frontier, and suggested that the
Kurdish populations in this region should be targets of Ottoman efforts to assert greater
control. His main point was that “denying material support to the Kurdish in the border
areas would hamper the Ottomans’ ability to function as an effective deterrent against
Safavid incursions.” 69 This type of message was interesting because it was phrased as an
explicit need to protect the Kurds, who were part of the Ottoman Empire, but a departure
from the tradition of anti-Shi’i polemic. Aziz Efendi held that even though the Kurds
were practicers of Sunni Islam “economic necessity or military insecurity” could force
their hand into a new allegiance with the Safavids, and therefore the government should
seek to prevent this from happening. 70 Aziz Efendi remarked upon the changing
administration of these lands not because any territorial shift had taken place in Ottoman
governing, but rather because the sheer expanse of Ottoman territories had afforded
power to certain individuals in these regions that did not necessarily comply with
imperial rule. While Aziz Efendi’s remarks come after the reign of Selim and Sϋleyman,
they provide clear insight into issues present throughout the entire Ottoman dynasty.
Aziz Efendi began his recommendations by reminding his audience about the
governorship that was intended in the lands, which was aimed to protect the people while
ensuring a system of economic efficiency. These processes were built with administrative
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effectiveness with detailed registers of how tax and revenues could be collected without
imposing unfair practices upon the people:
Stewards, in turn, protected and preserved the villagers and collected the
revenues with justice and equity, aware that when they gave account of the
revenues in detailed registers each foresighted minister would ask them to
swear that they had not included any forbidden or ill-gotten gains in their
accounting. 71
While, the legitimacy of this process did rely on the promise of an individual, in essence
it worked due to the fact that it was an efficient way to administer such a large empire. It
was also a mechanism that assigned a specific occupation for the protection of the people
in these lands that meant that there was a greater sense of security for their own finances
and the government’s finances. Yet, this process changed under the administration of
greedy Ottoman officials in the area:
The vezirs abandoning the above-described imperial system of assigning
long-term trusteeship over their prescribed lands to trusted stewards
farmed out these domains formerly belonging to the imperial domain on a
short-term year-to-year basis to members of their own household and
allowed them to ruin and destroy them. 72
Vezirs, Ottoman provincial governors afforded a degree of autonomy in their respective
regions, had clearly violated the system set up to ensure economic efficiency in return for
imperial protection. Such blatant disregard towards the rule of the sultan was perhaps
uncommon in an empire that had inspired such devotion to their ruler, but certainly not
unheard of. It was these actions that Efendi was most concerned about because of the
Kurdish region’s strategic importance to the Ottoman order. Consequently he was unsure
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of whether or not their religious convictions were enough to prevent them from favoring
new leadership:
Not only is this treachery to the sovereign, but it also gives consent and
encouragement to oppression and injustice and creates obstacles to good
deeds and benefactions. 73

Aziz Efendi’s comments are a clear departure from what the sultan had intended Ottoman
rule to consist of in these provinces. Creating an informal code that had allowed the
Ottoman’s to maintain order in their empire in return for collecting taxes, the Ottomans
assured that all of their people would be provided with protection. Such a system
guaranteed security from the government while not appearing overbearing and intrusive
in these regions:
Sultan Sϋleyman too on his part satisfied and delighted the hearts of the
Kurdish commanders by issuing grants of proprietorship containing clear
terms of conferral and extended to them the shade of imperial protection. 74
Yet, the nature of the Ottoman Empire allowed these vezirs to often govern as they saw
fit, mainly because the Ottomans had conquered so many territories that it was impossible
for the sultan to overlook the administration of all of them. This relationship had worked
somewhat successfully when the importance of strategic location was of greater priority
to the provincial leaders, but when the vezirs ignored their duty to the Empire, the
potential distress caused to the sovereignty of the sultans could be significant. This was
especially the case for territories that were not in close proximity to the capital or major
provincial garrisons, where dispersing the army could be achieved with less logistical
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stress. Thus, part of Aziz Efendi’s comments contains a request for the current sultan to
take action in this region because of its importance:
Under the circumstances therefore if it should be the will of his imperial
majesty in whom felicity abides that the country of Kurdistan to be
restored to its prosperity and abundance and that the Kurdish chiefs
acquire strength and power and attain the capability for the services which
until this date they have performed. 75
Thus, were the sultan or central government to take action in this region it would ensure
greater protection for the empire as a whole. This is a point that Aziz Efendi tries to
communicate by remarking upon the services that the Kurds potentially provide,
foreshadowing that while they have engaged in these duties so far, their continued loyalty
is not a certainty and something that should definitely not be taken for granted. Therefore,
Aziz Efendi proposes that the sultan’s intervention would prevent such a possibility from
every manifesting:
Then whereas previously they [Kurds] had all been reduced to weak
kittens, not only would they be transformed into fierce lions and
comparable to raging elephants in seeking out the Iranian heretics, but
they would also act as a firm barrier and a coterminous boundary and
obstacle between the territory of the Iranian redheads and your majesty’s
well-protected realm, thereby, by God the exalted commander and with
the fortune and strength to be able to challenge the Shah of Iran, would not
this be a most great and momentous blessing? 76
In Aziz Efendi’s final plea to the sultan, he reconciles the same issues that Ebussuud
struggled with in trying to marry practical administration with ideological superiority.
Aziz Efendi believes that his suggestion is an extremely logical and religiously sound
proposition because it empowers the Kurds strategically to the point that they do not have
to question their Sunni Muslim faith. Moreover, there is the sense that the Kurds would
75
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be able to take a more active role in the defense of the Empire as Aziz Efendi suggests
such empowerment would not only be able to protect them from advances by the
Safavids, but also enable them to fight the Shah preemptively. Whether such independent
decision-making was envisaged in the sultan’s plans is certainly an intriguing question,
but it does allow for more flexibility when determining how to become the singular, more
dominant faith. There is also an interesting acknowledgement of the status of the Kurds
in the Ottoman Empire, who were being described as an “obstacle” to a foreign invasion
and suggests their communal status in the Ottoman order. This was certainly recognized
in the nineteenth century of the Ottoman Empire as the Kurdish beys, chieftains of small
tribal groups, rebelled against their leaders and spearheaded new territorial shifts in
Anatolia.
In the aftermath of the Ottoman Empire it is important to acknowledge that
yoking religious doctrine to ideological supremacy often invoked recrimination and
violent opposition. After the reign of Sultan Sϋleyman, various groups emerged that
became part of a backlash to the assertion of imperial power through religious
justification. There were a number of revolutions and revolts, where students and scholars
tried to reinforce their interpretation of the law and imperial space. As part of this
movement, there was a reassertion of the purity of Islam and an effort to return to the
fundamentals of the faith. Of particular note were the Kadızadeli movement and the role
it played in the post-Sϋleyman Ottoman order. The emphasis of this movement rivaled
the Sufi orders in the seventeenth century, and its leaders premised their claims upon the
need to rid any corruption they found inside the Ottoman order. For the movement,
corruption was portrayed as innovation, and the result of the Empire’s distortion of Islam
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as it conquered new territories. 77 Yet, these corruptions were located not only in the
credibility that the Ottoman religious elites had preached in order to profess the sultan as
the one true ruler, but also towards certain types of prayer, pilgrimages to the tombs of
saints, the use of coffee, tobacco, and opium, and Sufi rituals that included dance and
song. 78 Thus, a movement that aimed to assert more binary notions of what constituted a
true Islamic identity challenged the tolerant atmosphere that the Ottoman rulers had
attempted to propagate. The fact that the followers of this movement were drawn from
modest aspects of the Ottoman political spectrum was particularly appealing because
many of these people had watched as Christians and Jews had risen to much higher ranks
in the Ottoman government. While, the Kadızadeli movement was not successful in the
reorganization of the Ottoman order, it was not because their ideology was deemed
infallible, but rather because it depended upon elite patronage that was often manipulated
to specific ends. 79 Thus, if certain political figures no longer had need for the movement
or they found that the militaristic elements of it were deemed to be too destabilizing to
not only the Ottoman order but also their positions, the movement was often cast aside.
Yet, this movement demonstrates that the Ottoman administrator’s efforts to bend
religious legal precepts and the doctrine of jihad to its own will had not gone unnoted.
Thus, the nature of Ottoman conquest, the establishment of a new version of imperial and
religious orthodoxy, and the opposition to this move from Seyh Bedreddin to the
Kadızadeli movement illustrate the diverse ways in which jihad was mobilized in the
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Ottoman realm. These historical processes reveal a new dimension for the concept of
jihad, one that could be incited when its ideological importance served the purpose of
maintaining law and order. Or, when frontier problems continued to plague the Empire,
might be minimized when practical administrative duties prioritized cooperation over
volatile rhetoric.
The chronology of the Kadızadeli movement is of particular interest, as its
eventual demise in the 1730s was on the eve of the rise of Wahhabism. Links between the
founder of Wahhabism, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, and aspects of the Kadızadeli
movement are crucial in determining where the foundations of the future Saudi state
emerged. Similarities between the two ideologies can be seen in their respective tenets
with the ultimate aim of returning to traditional interpretations of the Qur’an and
dispelling other notions of Islam that had arisen during the rise of the Ottoman Empire.
The connections that Wahhab had to significant patrons of the Kadızadeli movement
cannot be understated, especially “given the staunchness of the Kadızadeli in general and
their prominence on the Ottoman scene for so long” an environment that Wahhab was
raised in. 80 Wahhab himself, who is described as having studied under numerous
scholars, “specifically gaining scholarly authorizations in hadith from three of his
teachers, Shaykh ‘Ali Afendi al-Daghistani, Shaykh ‘Abdullah ibn Ibrahim al-Najdi and
Shaykh ‘Abd al-Latif al-Ahsa’i, all of whom studied in Damascus,” creates a connection
to the strongest advocates of the Kadızadeli movement. 81 Thus, tracing the lineage of
80
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scholarly authorizations from Wahhab to his predecessors and the chronology of the two
movements means that some of the teachings that influenced Wahhab would have had
their roots in the movement a few decades earlier. This is especially likely when
considering that the scholarly authorizations that his teacher’s received were from
“Hanbali hadith circles in Damascus, at a time of heightened Kadızadeli activity there.” 82
While the geographical distance between Damascus and Najd, where Wahhab began
preaching, challenges the relationship between the two, it does reveal the prevailing
winds of change that had gripped Islam in the decline of the Ottoman Empire. Ultimately,
it was this window of opportunity that Wahhab would embrace in reviving many aspects
of the Kadızadeli movement in his own ideology of Wahhabism.
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IV
Modern State Making: Institutionalizing Religious Zeal & Political
Aims through the Ikhwan & Ibn Sa’ud

D

espite the Ottoman Empire’s unprecedented amount of success in both
establishing and administering such a vast region of land, its gradual loss

of territory amidst increasing interstate global competition allowed new politically empty
spaces to emerge. While for many territories this decline provided an opportunity to
retake their independence, in the central and eastern parts of Arabia the fortunes of the
Ottoman Empire had little impact on the lives of many tribal systems that had long since
existed. The aridness of the region meant there were few incentives for either the
Ottomans or the Europeans to seek out territorial influence or fully conquer this area. As
a result, an exploration into the movements of the eighteenth century can largely be seen
as arising and responding from local conditions. 1 Of these movements grew one of the
most significant political and religious entities that would re-shape Sunni Islam’s identity
on the global stage. The union formed between Muhammad ibn Sa'ud and Muhammad
ibn Abd al-Wahhab would become a powerful bond that forged a new nation, the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and a lasting basis for the legitimacy of the state. While critics
of the Kingdom assert that the form of Islam practiced in the Kingdom is at complete
odds with contemporary standards of human rights and misinterprets the egalitarian
vision of Islam, the Kingdom’s steadfast affirmation of the foundations it was based upon
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is a testament to the lasting union between two influential individuals in its history. The
very basis of the Saudi state was founded upon a religious and political union that set a
precedent for the future of the country. The relationship between ibn Sa'ud and Wahhab
reveals how different spheres of influence were reconciled with one another in order to
achieve a single power. However, this was not always such a blessed union and the
relationship’s troubled history reveals the immense effort entailed in this state-making
enterprise. Moreover, the rise and fall of the Ikhwan Movement, an Islamist ideological
commitment to purifying Islam, forms a critical component in the history of Saudi Arabia
as it highlights the return of a crusading mentality dependent on binary connotations of
insiders and outsiders. The movement also articulates the tension that exists in any effort
to preserve a certain type of religious sanctity with political goals crucial to the progress
of a nation. Once again, in this context, zealous religious rhetoric, espoused as jihad,
resurfaces as a cornerstone of the Ikhwan’s actions and played a central role in the
emergence of the modern Saudi Kingdom.

The First Saudi State: Wahhabi Ideology & Political Patronage
The very foundations of Saudi Arabia provide the first instance of a relationship
between religion and politics, one that would be revised two centuries later with the
emergence of the Ikhwan. The relationship built between ibn Sa'ud and ibn Wahhab grew
out of unique circumstances that later shaped the nature of the Ikhwan movement as well.
The history of Saudi Arabia can be traced back to the central region of Najd, where a lack
of interest from foreign conquerors meant the region’s history had been marked “more by
local tribal warfare and chieftains struggling for power than by its position as part of a
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broader state or empire.” 2 Such an environment was able to exist in Najd because the area
“had no claim to commercial or religious importance” thus held little interest for the
stronger powers in Arabia, such as the Ottomans. 3 This culture allowed the Najdis to
retain their individuality and independence without incurring serious repercussions from
any surrounding centralized power. 4 Thus, there was little pressure in Najd to conform to
a particular Muslim identity or political authority, leaving an ideological open space for
the promulgation of different forms of Islam. It was in this space that Wahhabism first
gathered momentum, and would later contribute significant character to the future Saudi
Arabian identity. 5
Within this ideological open space a consistent emphasis on tawhid, or the
oneness of God, emerged almost as a reaction to the diverse set of interpretations taking
place in the Ottoman Empire. In essence, the reformers that were present in Najd
advocated for a return to the fundamentals of faith - the Muslim scriptures of the Qur’an
and the hadith - as the “sources of guidance that would lead to the socio-moral
reconstruction of society.” 6 The fact that these reformers were aware of the changing
nature of Islam is an important issue to be aware of, because it acknowledges that these
preachers had travelled throughout the Arabian region and observed such interpretations
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and their role in defining a political system. Therefore, derivatives of certain religious
movements, such as the Kadızadeli movement, may have had an influence on the
religious sentiments that later emerged in this space. The belief that important Qur’anic
interpretations had been lost as Islam became inextricably tied to a more centralized and
modernizing political system was a new challenge that had not previously existed for
Muslim-based polities. It was the aim of these reformers, through the fundamentals of
Islam, to enable society to rediscover the meaning of the religion in its original context in
order to determine “the eternal value or ethical guidelines” contained within it. 7
However, it is crucial to acknowledge that these reformers, although they called on the
authority of a pure Muslim past, acted in a new medium of the modern. The past
legitimized their novel actions in the present, especially in that sense that they sought to
re-interpret the heritage of Islam in ways that would be meaningful “in both the private
and public spheres.” 8 This meant that the proponents of ibn Wahhab challenged the
authority of tribal orders, as they inserted religious beliefs into public life, and proposed
that God should stand at the center of the political order. As a result, it became necessary
for the reformers to seek a political alliance for their own protection, and they in turn
provided a legitimate religious base for the tribal leaders. 9 These associations were to
become the foundations of Saudi Arabia, as it was during this tumultuous time that the
tribal lineage of ibn Sa’ud provided protection to the teachings of Muhammad ibn Abd
al-Wahhab.

7

Ibid., 11.
Ibid.
9
Ibid., 13.
8

Tracing Islamic Extremist Ideologies | 103

A local Najdi, ibn Wahhab spent time travelling throughout the region,
accumulating knowledge on Islam and its practices from the various parts of the Ottoman
Empire. His exposure to the religion came primarily through Hanbali juridical doctrine,
what is perceived to be the most conservative legal school of Islam. The Hanbali School
of jurisprudence requires a very literal reading of scripture and eschews interpretative
efforts by scholars; consequently it is of little surprise that ibn Wahhab’s teachings
required such an orientation to scripture. 10 Moreover, Wahhabism’s fundamental precepts
are derived in part from the medieval jurist Ahmad Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya and his
student Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, which were both aimed at returning to orthodox Islam
in the midst of Mongol invasions, and defined true Islam as that “practiced by the very
first generations.” 11 Throughout ibn Wahhab’s travels he noticed how the Muslim umma
and its political leaders had deviated from the principles of monotheism as “people
indulged in bida, considered the worst sin” for orthodox Islamists. 12 Bid’a was the act of
innovation in religious matters and often used as a mode of recrimination against
temporal power. These accusations were reminiscent of the backlash the Ottoman Empire
faced in the aftermath of Sultan Sϋleyman’s reign by the Kadızadeli movement. Thus,
there was certainly a reactionary element to the changes in Islam that came from
reorganizing the religion to fit a political mold. However, for Wahhabism to be
sustainable it had to accommodate the shifting arrangements of its time, otherwise it
would have endangered itself to the point that it would have ceased to exist.
Consequently, it is interesting that Wahhabism preaches a return to orthodox Islam in
"Wahhābīya." Encyclopedia of Islam, First Edition (1913-1936), 3.
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order to ensure the power of religion to shape political conditions, when it too was
dependent on alliances for its very preservation. 13 Wahhabism flourished precisely due to
political and social upheaval, as the consistent sense of political turmoil in central Arabia,
with multiple warring tribes, had led to “an atmosphere of widespread popular
dissatisfaction in the area of religion.” 14This fostered an environment that perhaps
encouraged religious influences in political affairs as “striving for new ideals” in order to
quell chaos created a sustained link between Islam and politics in the Arabian
Peninsula. 15 The challenge lay in finding an aspect of Islam that resonated with the rule
of a particular political leader, and more importantly, one that would not pose a threat to
the administration of their territories. The alliance between the House of Sa’ud and ibn
Wahhab achieved a unique balance--it wove political stability with religious legitimacy
and thus created a cohesive mechanism for centralized rule in the heart of the Najd.
Wahhabi doctrine required ultimate commitment to its beliefs. The fact that there
needed to be both private and public recognition of the oneness of God meant those who
could not outwardly prove their dedication would not be deemed as true advocates of the
fundamentals of Islam. It is interesting that followers of ibn Wahhab never named
themselves Wahhabis, instead, the members of the religious sect thought this would have
been contradictory to their teachings, as it would detract from the principle of oneness
and fierce dedication to perceived unity in the past. To provide ibn Wahhab with public
recognition or superiority in a religious context was to say that he shared the same space
as God, and that was not what ibn Wahhab was preaching. Thus, those who did follow
13
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this interpretation of Islam referred to themselves as either “monotheists or simply
Muslims” with the inherent implication that this was the only true form of Muslim
belief. 16 Wahhabi followers therefore viewed any other Muslim that did not share their
teaching to be far worse than polytheists. 17 To a certain extent, this was not particularly
surprising, as Muslims who did not adhere to this dogma were deemed partially
responsible for the corruption of the religion that had caused the moral decay of society.
Despite the rigidity of its ideological convictions, the movement quickly gained a
popular following due to its intrinsic connection to Najd, an area that had been left
relatively unscathed by the religious innovations taking place in the Ottoman Empire.
Therefore, central to maintaining the success of ibn Wahhab’s ideology was making sure
the unity in Najd remained untainted, as it was the central population base that the
followers originated from. 18 In many respects the ideology of Wahhabism fit perfectly
with the bedouin 19 mentality because it did not require them to change practical aspects
of their lives, such as conducting raids for economic support. This was how the bedouin
maintained their economic independence, and as such it was an extremely integrated part
of their lives. Through Wahhabism, such behavior did not have to change instead, under
the banner of jihad and Islam it provided increased impetus to engage in such actions. 20
Direct linkages between the context of the Arabian Peninsula in the lifetime of
Muhammad and the patterns of contemporary living in the region reinforced the
relationship between Wahhabi principles and tribal realities. Furthermore, a union
16
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between Wahhabis and tribes was particularly appealing because it provided an
extremely mobile military force that could materialize with little notice when necessary,
which would later become significant in the formation of the Ikhwan as well.
The banner of jihad would prove to be a central force in the growth of
Wahhabism, and it also fueled an ideological division between in-groups and out-groups.
The nature of Wahhabism promoted the idea of returning to the fundamentals of the
religion and interpreting and reinterpreting the holy texts in order to gain a more
insightful and long lasting set of beliefs. Yet, interpretation led to difference, and the
proliferation of opinion was something Wahhabi traditions guarded against. They did so
by forming a rigid distinction “between exclusivists and inclusivists.” 21 This divide was
important because “inclusivists” were of the thought process that regardless of whether or
not a Muslim decided to follow the Wahhabi track, they were still believers in Islam. 22
Whereas, the exclusivists were definite proponents of a binary interpretation of jihad and
asserted that those who were not Wahhabis were infidels. This division materialized in
later dealings with the Egyptians in 1818. The fact that the prevailing trend of Islam
practiced in Egypt was not Wahhabism led to eventual clashes with the Egyptians. Yet,
the inclusivists advocated for a different course of action that may have prevented the end
to the second Saudi state. Their preferred mode of action would have led them into
discussions with the Egyptians, not to accommodate their beliefs but to reveal that it was
inferior to Wahhabi ideology. 23 It can be argued that this method of action was merely
preventing the inevitable, as it seems unlikely that the Egyptians would have conformed
21

Lacroix., 12.
Ibid., 11.
23
Ibid., 13.
22

Tracing Islamic Extremist Ideologies | 107

to their Wahhabi counterparts, especially when they were aware of their superior military
strength. Yet, it does reveal that even though Wahhabism was a strictly conservative form
of Islam, within it there were differing attitudes in how this conservatism should be
enacted in order to achieve goals that united politics with religion.
The union between ibn Sa'ud and ibn Wahhab resulted from particular
circumstances that made each of them aware of the mutual benefits that might arise from
their union. Ibn Wahhab’s influence in his home of ‘Uyayna had increased to the point
where many locals had embraced his interpretation of Islam and were enforcing it as a
mechanism of governance. This enforcement reached a climax when a case of adultery
was brought to him and a woman admitted to the act and was punished with stoning, in
line with Wahhabi doctrine. 24 Ibn Mu’ammar, the ruler of ‘Uyayna, had allowed Wahhab
to act freely up to this point because the latter had agreed to support and expand
Mu’ammar’s rule “over Najd and possibly beyond.” 25 However, ibn Wahhab’s actions
gained the attention of Ibn Ghurayr, of the neighboring tribe Bani Khalid, who held
substantial influence over Najd, and he pressured Mu’ammar into forcing Wahhab to
leave ‘Uyayna. 26 While there is speculation over why Ghurayr acted in this manner, there
exists the possibility that he had made his own agreements with his own religious ulemas
who were the driving force behind these actions, thus preserving their religious power
base against the rising popularity of ibn Wahhab. The expulsion of ibn Wahhab led him
to Diriyah, which was ruled by ibn Sa'ud. With the common trend in Najd consistently
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forcing religious and political leaders to unite in order to more effectively serve their
goals, ibn Sa'ud and ibn Wahhab consequently discussed a union. Having witnessed the
influence ibn Wahhab possessed over the people of ‘Uyayna, he recognized what
prospects were possible with this relationship and how they would aid his own
“ambitious plans.” 27 On the other hand, ibn Wahhab had realized that his influence had
little worth if he had no means to protect his followers or to ensure that his practices
would not encounter any backlash. Thus the need for “military support” and political
backing was a necessity. 28 The alliance was concluded in 1744 and with that, the first
Saudi state emerged.
The union between these two influential individuals was divided on the basis that
ibn Wahhab would be responsible for religious matters and ibn Sa'ud would be in charge
of political and military issues. This arrangement was intended to take the form of ibn
Wahhab interpreting the sacred text and ibn Sa’ud being responsible for the governance
and application of Wahhab’s interpretations. Moreover, ibn Sa’ud would also be
responsible for the wellbeing of all areas where their texts could not be interpreted or
lacked an opinion “provided the actions did not contradict any clear shari’a principle.” 29
With a firm platform set, and clear guidelines as to how this dynamic would operate, ibn
Sa’ud conducted his very first raids on his neighbors. The rewards were distributed in
accordance with Wahhabi doctrine, “one fifth went to Muhammad ibn Sa'ud and the rest
to the fighters.” 30 This was an important moment in the new union because the success of
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these raids ensured the protection of ibn Wahhab as his doctrine of Islam brought clear
material rewards for the efforts of those who subscribed to it. This success was the
catalyst of a chain reaction that changed the “very character of local power” as supporters
of ibn Sa’ud gradually replaced independent sheikhs. 31 The exponential growth of
Wahhabism in the first Saudi state did not go unnoticed or unchallenged and in fact, one
of the biggest opponents of this renewed commitment to Islam was Wahhab’s brother,
Sulaiman. The sheer aggression with which Wahhabists pursued and executed their new
beliefs brought Sulaiman and Muhammad into confrontation:
Sulaiman once asked his brother Muhammad, ‘How many are the pillars
of Islam, O Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab?’ ‘Five’, he answered.
Sulaiman replied, ‘No, you have added a sixth one. It reads that one who
does not follow you is not a Muslim. To you, it is the sixth pillar of
Islam. 32
The belief that Wahhab’s teachings had grown to the point that he was now regarded in
an almost divine status is certainly ironic, given the importance that was placed on fierce
monotheism and the absolute oneness of God. The fact that Wahhabism had filled a void
of religious zeal that had been absent from the Arabian world for a few centuries is
crucial in understanding why his teachings were so passionately embraced. It is in this
light we can see the foundations that would bind the House of Sa'ud and Wahhabism for
the next 300 years and recognize that the relationship would consistently dominate
political practices.
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Political Instability in the Intervening Years
The first Saudi state existed until 1818 when the Ottoman viceroy of Egypt,
Mehmed Ali Pasha, destroyed it. If the Wahhabists had kept their raids in the general area
of Najd, there is little chance that the rest of the Muslim world would have noticed their
actions, as had been the general history of Najd. Yet, after the death of ibn Sa'ud in 1765,
the lineage of the House of Sa’ud continued to expand the Wahhabi mission and in 1801
these raids extended towards Karbala, the Shi’i shrine in eastern Iraq, and the Sunni
controlled town of Hijaz. 33 Throughout the Ottoman Empire, the Hijaz was a territory
that the Ottomans refused to concede to local leaders, yet, at this juncture in their reign
they were not in a position to fully engage with the Saudis in order to recover it.
Therefore, they sent Mehmed Ali Pasha, the semi-independent commander of their
garrison in Egypt to recapture the city. 34 Mehmed Ali came into conflict with Saud’s
great-grandson, ‘Abd Allah ibn Sa'ud ibn ‘Abd al Aziz, who was quickly overcome by
the strength of the larger and superior Egyptian army. As a result, ‘Abd Allah took the
opportunity to retreat back into the center of the Saudi state, however, they were further
pursued by the Egyptians and made their final stand in Diriyah, which they managed to
hold onto for two years before capitulating. 35 Prior to these conflicts, ibn Wahhab had
also passed away although in the nineteenth century his religious field was expanded to a
small number of other families from Najd. These families soon emerged as a “veritable
religious aristocracy, the exclusive guardians and preservers of the intellectual legacy of
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al-Wahhab against his detractors.” 36 Yet, without a strong military to support this
religious doctrine, it was also subdued for a period of time.
The disappearance of the first Saudi state sparked a series of competitive battles
and tension within the House of Sa'ud regarding who should be responsible for its return.
This competition was shaped by who had access to power and what resources they could
afford to assert a claim to become a worthy successor to his rule. 37 During this period of
time there seems little to suggest that much had changed in the Wahhabi ideology, and
consequently it became more of background issue while the House of Sa'ud tried to
reorganize its political structure. The fact that a smaller second Saudi state reemerged in
the Najd in 1824, and was unable to extend its influence beyond this region, is reflective
of the political instability that marked this period of time. This was the general trend of
the early- to mid- nineteenth century and climaxed towards the end of the century when
the al-Rashid family challenged the House of Sa’ud from Jebel Shammar, in Northern
Najd. 38 The power struggles between the different brothers in the House of Sa'ud had led
to a power vacuum, which was the direct cause of the defeat and exile of the Sa'ud in
1891. 39 As the al-Rashid tribe emerged as the ruling family of Najd, the House of Sa'ud
retreated for sanctuary to Kuwait. 40 It is from these roots that the role of the Ikhwan
would become significant and the world would see Wahhabism emerge with renewed
vigor in alliance with ‘Abdulaziz ibn Muhammad al-Sa'ud or as he would simply become
known as, ibn Sa'ud.
36
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The Rise of ibn Sa'ud & Founding the Ikhwan
During his exile in Kuwait, ibn Sa'ud built a relationship with the ruler of the
country, Sheikh Mubarak predominantly based on a series of consistent conflicts between
the Kuwaitis and the Rashidis. Under Mubarak’s tutelage, ibn Sa'ud was exposed to
various political and military teachings as well as having the opportunity to campaign
with Mubarak on multiple occasions. His father took an active role in imparting
Wahhabist beliefs and thought processes, which also supplemented these experiences in
the formative years of his life. This is an important moment in ibn Sa'ud’s life as Sheikh
Mubarak was not an extremely strict adherent of Sunni Islam, and ibn Sa'ud’s father’s
disapproval of this way of life was the beginning of his son’s relationship with Wahhabist
Islam. The commitment that ibn Sa'ud would make to Islam would become much more
formalized after marriage to his third wife, Tarfa “a descendant of the founder of the
Wahhabi doctrine.” 41 The commitment that ibn Sa'ud had made to the history of
Wahhabism is crucial in determining his orientation on the spectrum of Wahhabism and
how he balanced it’s extremely conservative ideals with political pragmatism. After the
death of Muhammad ibn Rashid in 1897, there was a significant opportunity for the
House of Sa'ud to recapture Najd, as his successor was young and inexperienced. 42 Thus,
after gaining the support of the Kuwaitis, ibn Sa'ud, 26 at the time, set out on a raiding
expedition into the Najd, which proved to be relatively successful. Consequently, it
provided the momentum for ibn Sa'ud to further these exploits leading to the successful
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attack on Riyadh and the beginning of the third Saudi state. 43 The success of ibn Sa'ud
once again prompted the intervention of the Ottomans, aiding the Rashidis, who defeated
a Saudi army. However, the death of ‘Abdulaziz al-Rashid at the hands of the Saudis in
1906 ended the Ottoman presence in Najd. With the opportunity to restore the House of
Sa'ud to its former glory in Najd almost complete, ibn Sa'ud looked to establish a similar
style of order as in the first Saudi state, which led to the founding of the Ikhwan.
The motivation for creating this union between religion and politics was to bring
back a semblance of order as it existed in 1744. Between the combined power of religion
and “the sword” the new Saudi state would ensure a greater degree of security for its
people as well as “centralization of governmental authority and universality of religious
practice.” 44 The bond that ibn Sa'ud sought was thus not unique to Saudi history and in
fact he actively recognized that the Najd had the “inherent superior capacity to re-unify
the peninsula” because of the foundations laid there by his forefathers and by ibn
Wahhab. 45 Recognizing that he needed his own force to protect the territories he had
captured, the Ikhwan proved to be the perfect weapon in the early stages of this Saudi
state for several reasons. Due to the nomadic bedouin lifestyle, movement amongst these
people was central to the culture, a factor that ibn Sa'ud counted upon when he began
“preaching an Islamic revival.” 46 His success in persuading these people to settle into
“semi-religious-military-agricultural communities called hujar” was the basis of the
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Ikhwan lifestyle, as it required little change to their everyday activities. 47 These efforts
were not extremely difficult as the history of the Najd elevated Wahhabism to become the
spiritual center of the region, and ibn Sa'ud simply reminded people of this in the postRashidi era. 48 With this in mind, ibn Sa'ud recognized the benefits of approaching the
bedouin people in the formation of a militant arm as they provided an “ascetic, military
force, which could be mobilized and demobilized swiftly with the political reliability and
loyalty of the villager.” 49 Through this medium of protection, ibn Sa'ud ensured that these
settled colonies were strategically placed around the Najd in order to ensure the most
effective style of security he could guarantee. 50 In securing a military force for the
protection of this region, ibn Sa'ud had carved out a renewed independence for his
people, which was secure enough to prevent any immediate threat to its borders.
The perfectly crafted mechanism by which ibn Sa'ud managed to convince the
bedouin people to join his cause was the inextricable link between their lifestyles and the
principles of Wahhabism. As a result, the Ikhwan of Najd emerged in 1913 and came to
be known as those bedouins “who accepted the fundamentals of Orthodox Islam of the
Hanbali School as preached by Abd-al-Wahhab.” 51 The literal meaning of the term
Ikhwan is “Brethren” or “Brotherhood” and was the uniting factor and term for men of
the bedouin population who “left their abodes and became settled in a special place
[Islam], and built for their homes mud huts known as hujar as a sign that they left their
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own detestful life for another more beloved life.” 52 The bedouin lifestyle and mentality
was now grounded in religious sanctity, and became the main ideological driver of their
aggressive raids and conquests of other lands. The renewed crusading mentality that was
based in religious zeal was reminiscent of Salah al-Din’s speeches that motivated his
troops against the Crusaders. The sense of spiritual invigoration that dominated the lives
of the Ikhwan came to be their identifying factor as they carved out an image of military
enforcers for the House of Sa’ud. This posture soon earned them a badge of fear from
non-Wahhabists and furthered their own commitments to the ideals and beliefs that ibn
Wahhab had highlighted a few centuries ago.
As ibn Sa'ud continued to expand in the Najd region and beyond, the Ikhwan
became even more important for achieving the successful unification of territory. At the
same time, however, a British foreign presence was also increasing in the region as they
sought to create resistance to Ottoman power from within the Arab provinces. While the
Ikhwan continued to become a threatening armed movement with increasing fanaticism,
it served ibn Sa'ud’s interest “to conceal the rapid rise and military capability of the
Ikhwan.” 53 In doing so, ibn Sa'ud could prevent the British interference in these affairs,
which was continually requested by the Sharif of Mecca and King of Hijaz, Hussein ibn
Ali al-Hashimi, both of whom were concerning about ibn Sa’ud’s expanding power. At
this time, the British were in favor of aiding Hussein because it served their purpose
against the Ottomans, yet, a threat to Hussein’s power could also bolster the Ottoman
forces in European territories. While King Hussein appealed to the British for help in his
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matters with ibn Sa'ud and the Ikhwan, the fact that ibn Sa'ud had managed to cloak the
Ikhwan’s military capability was central in any aid coming, as seen in these
correspondences between Hussein and the British:
What concerns me above everything else is that HMG should compel the
Emir [ibn Sa'ud] to abolish and disperse what he calls the Ikhwan - the
political society in the cloak of religion. 54
The British version of events suggests a different story:
King Hussein would hardly be justified in demanding the suppression of
the Ikhwan in ibn Sa'ud’s sphere, though he may take what measures he
chose to exclude them from his own. As this is primarily a religious affair
concerning independent Arabs, it would be difficult for HMG to take
action. 55
In these instances the veil of religion proved more powerful than ever for ibn Sa'ud as it
allowed the Ikhwan to act with political immunity and without fear of backlash from a
British supported King Hussein. The fact that the British perceived mutually exclusive
spheres of politics and religion and refused to become involved accordingly, worked to
ibn Sa’ud’s advantage. The British, concerned with the outbreak of war in other parts of
central and southeastern Europe, avoiding becoming entangled in what they perceived to
be an issue of religious ideology. This moment isolated King Hussein from his foreign
allies despite recognizing the central role that the Ikhwan played in ibn Sa'ud’s
expansion.
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Institutionalizing the Ikhwan & the Growth of Political Power
As part of their broadening relevance to ibn Sa'ud’s expansion, the Ikhwan came
to embody several mannerisms that were crucial in the process of establishing a sense of
identity and independence of their own. The central tenet that appears in all accounts of
the Ikhwan is their “religious fanaticism, more, their eagerness to die in battle on behalf
of God and Islam,” which gave birth to all other practices of the Ikhwan. 56 Consequently,
actions such as refusing to return the Islamic salutation to non-Ikhwan individuals or
covering their face as opposed to looking at those perceived to be infidels, fed into the
notion of a religiously motivated duty to keep their religion as pure as possible. 57 This
behavior comprised elements of the Hanbali school of thought as it required literal
interpretations of the holy texts in order to “return to pure Islam which Muhammad had
preached and where is worship is due to God alone.” 58 The Ikhwan’s unwillingness to
compromise in their actions was rooted in the fact that they believed such behavior to be
virtuous. Moreover, becoming an armed faction of ibn Sa'ud’s order propagated their
religiously fanatic mannerisms due to the political patronage received. 59 The origins of
the Ikhwan came from ibn Sa'ud seeking them out and providing them with this religious
purpose, while their fanaticism was cultivated as they grew more and more powerful. In
many respects the bedouin’s religious education would have come from the local ulema
that espoused these ideas as they circulated through religious education. 60 At the
beginning of ibn Sa'ud’s political ventures it served him well to have this overly zealous
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sect because it compensated for a lack of imposing military forces, yet, as the movement
continued its growth and as more bedouins became enamored with it, the rigid
ideological goals of Wahhabism began to pose a threat to the political stability ibn Sa'ud
sought.
Thus, the relationship between ibn Sa'ud and the Ikhwan constantly changed in
response to the shifting power dynamics in Arabia. As already mentioned, the Ikhwan
served a significant purpose at the beginning of ibn Sa'ud’s campaign for power as there
was little else he could rely on to change the status quo. However, once ibn Sa’ud had
established himself as a political entity, he had to play a much more diplomatic game in
order to ensure stability and thus the acquiescence of the people he presumed to rule. His
focus on status quo diplomacy challenged the revisionist goals of the Ikhwan and the
orthodoxy of Wahhabi ideologies more generally. Still, while ibn Sa'ud did not
necessarily share all the ideological commitments of the Ikhwan, the reality was “he was
unable to be the omnipresent overseer of Ikhwan conduct,” in all parts of the kingdom. 61
The movement itself was out of his control. The success of the Ikhwan caused a rush to
replicate their standards and way of life, “with a zealousness that could not be contained,”
and as this progression took place the Ikhwan continued to bring “nonconforming to
obedience.” 62 In many respects the Ikhwan were aware of this, and consequently assumed
a degree of autonomy in their activities stating they were sanctioned by ibn Sa'ud even if
this was not the case:
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Assaf ben Hussein el Mansur to Brother Rcheidren Smeir. Greethings!
YOU are aware that the Sultan of all the Arabs has ordered me to write
you this letter to inform you that you must let me know by special
messenger whether you are following the Moslem creed of Abdul Aziz.
Safety is for those who understand. You have been warned. You only have
yourselves to blame. 63
Such a statement demonstrates the way in which the Ikhwan also used their connection to
ibn Sa’ud for their own purposes, but as ibn Sa’ud increasingly turned to ensuring a
position of absolute supremacy, he feared the impact of doctrinal dogmatism. In fact at
the height of the Ikhwan’s power, ibn Sa'ud tried to prevent forced conversion because he
realized the backlash it would have from the British, one that would prevent him from
attaining a position of absolute power. 64 The changing relationship between the Ikhwan
and ibn Sa'ud reflects the struggle between defining a movement by its religious goals as
opposed to its political goals. For the Ikhwan, their birth revolved around religious texts
and fighting in a battle that had been waged since the Crusades, whereas, ibn Sa'ud
recognized the importance of this history but tried to reconcile it with modern standards
of political deliberation and deliberation.
In order to maintain the fragile balance between these two potentially
contradictory forces, ibn Sa'ud had to define the parameters in which the Ikhwan could
operate in the new Saudi state. Therefore, ibn Sa'ud continued his pragmatic efforts in
using the Ikhwan for his own ends while “skillfully bypassing its more extreme
requirements.” 65 Ibn Sa'ud approached this relationship by formalizing certain aspects of
Wahhabism that the Ikhwan were concerned with, in order to ease the tension between
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the political and religious bodies. 66 By appeasing the Ikhwan through the introduction of
strict Wahhabist regulation, ibn Sa'ud was able to show his own commitment to the
religion and ensure that a greater proportion remained loyal to him as opposed to the
Ikhwan. One mechanism for achieving this was through the establishment of the League
of Public Morality. This organization enabled ibn Sa'ud to demonstrate his own religious
beliefs, and yet still emphasized his control over the zealous Ikhwan, as it was an
institutional pathway to religious control. Within the League, ibn Sa'ud “ordered the
Ikhwan to inform them about all deeds that were permitted by the faith, although they
were not allowed to take unauthorized reprisals.” 67 The centralization of religious
authority restrained the Ikhwan from being able to enforce their own methods of religious
governance and gave greater power and control to ibn Sa'ud. The need to reign in such
religious zeal became even more apparent as ibn Sa'ud acquired increasing political status
after the conquest of Mecca in 1925. While he was able to do this with little bloodshed “it
was essential that ibn Sa'ud should win the approval of the Muslim world and reassure
Muslims that the new custodianship of the Holy Mosques was a change for the better.” 68
In many ways, control of Mecca gave the Ikhwan increased impetus to continue their
religious incursions, as they now felt sanctioned as defenders of these cities. However,
after ibn Sa'ud became the ruler of these newly acquired lands he realized the importance
of tempering the movement as greater gains could be made through diplomatic ventures.
This new development in the relationship meant the Ikhwan’s role would be duly
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subdued and potentially cast aside in favor of diplomacy and consequently brought the
Ikhwan and ibn Sa'ud into open conflict.
The need to reorder the hierarchy of ibn Sa'ud’s regime was closely related to
growing relations with the British, who recognized him now as the superior force in the
region. Curbing the Ikhwan’s religious zeal was crucial for preventing greater British
intervention and preserving the newfound independence that ibn Sa'ud had fashioned.
The inability to control the Ikhwan during the pilgrimage season of 1926 led to severe
conflicts with the Egyptians and a large casualty rate that ended diplomatic relations with
the country for 10 years. 69 The fact that such behavior would warrant closer attention
from other Muslim nations as well as the wider world meant ibn Sa'ud had to take more
concrete action to protect his political legitimacy. Consequently, the ruler ordered that
“no Ikhwan leader was to be governor of any Hejaz city” hopefully disassociating
himself and his government with the image of “unrestrained savagery” that the Ikhwan
now presented to the world. 70 The actions of ibn Sa'ud were not entirely unprecedented,
as the history of Saudi Arabia had predominantly recognized the role of tribal groups as
those who “were expected to fight for the state, not to function in any leading political or
administrative capacity.” 71 However, in the formation of ibn Sa'ud’s rule, the Ikhwan
recognized that the role they had played was much greater than any other previous tribal
entity and understood from this that they formed the basis of the Saudi military forces.
These practical factors, combined with their own religiously motivated, political
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ambitions presented ibn Sa'ud with special problems. 72 Moreover, the fact that ibn Sa'ud
continued to build his relationship with the British caused internal struggles as the
Ikhwan had become known in his regime as protectors of the “legitimate interests of
Islam” winning them support from many of ibn Sa'ud’s peers. 73 After winning Mecca,
ibn Sa’ud had been seen as distancing himself from the people in order to gain favor from
the British, and this compromised both his local legitimacy and his standing in the eyes of
other regional Muslim political leaders. These issues would confront each other as the
Ikhwan soon realized how ibn Sa'ud was trying to further subdue their religious mission
in favor of a different type of political stability.

British Influence & the Decline of the Ikhwan
As ibn Sa'ud’s actions against the Ikhwan increased, these tensions began to
escalate and led to disruptions with regards to the future course of the Saudi state. The
Ikhwan were becoming more and more aware that ibn Sa'ud’s actions against them were
driven, at least partially, by the growing British influence in Saudi affairs. As a result,
they became more vocal about ibn Sa'ud’s lack of commitment to Wahhabism’s ideals
because of his growing contact with the English, and how such actions were contrary to
the state the Ikhwan were committed to creating. 74 The dynamic between the Ikhwan and
ibn Sa'ud became more obvious to the British who appeared to empathize with ibn Sa'ud
in the situation:
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The Ehwan are hated and feared. They hardly form a suitable basis for
Eben Sa’ud’s empire, since, with their commander, they would be the first
to reject Eben Sa’ud should he fail to follow all of the prescriptions of
their creed. They now accuse him of being too mild toward other Muslims
and too obedient to the Europeans, and their disapproval of his attitude is
increasing with his introduction of various reforms. 75
The political sentiment voiced by the British resonated with the stability that ibn Sa'ud
was attempting to build. The key challenge between the Ikhwan and the emerging Saudi
state lay in differing motivations and priorities of the two groups. Ibn Sa'ud’s political
sentiments did not make him devoid of his religious obligations, rather “certain areas
gradually became understood as depending exclusively on the princes, such as relations
with foreign powers, explaining why the traditional Wahhabi ulema did not oppose Saudi
Arabia’s alliance with the United Kingdom in the early twentieth century.” 76 Yet, the
Ikhwan saw this as a corruption of Islam, and the state they wished to create would not
consider foreign powers, especially non-Muslims ones, as allies as these alliances would
stain the purity of Islam.
As the situation progressed, ibn Sa'ud realized that he would have to confront the
Ikhwan in a manner that would prevent a full-scale rebellion from not only the Ikhwan,
but also from many tribal leaders who sympathized with their cause or resisted the
incursion of centralized control more generally. As ibn Sa’ud worked to restrain the
activities of the Ikhwan, he issued orders that prevented them from raiding Iraqi citizens,
a controversial action because Iraq’s non-Wahhabist doctrine presumably opened them
up to raids and military challenge. British reactions to such dealings applauded ibn Sa'ud
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as a model politician who had managed to restrain the Ikhwan as much as possible, as
former Lieutenant-General Sir John Bagot Glubb recalled:
Caution had always distinguished the policy of Abdul Aziz ibn Sa'ud. He
had been confident of his power to defeat other Arabian princes, like Ibn
Rashid, but he was not prepared to engage in hostilities with Britain. The
Ikhwan were able to quote against him his own pronouncements of an
earlier date. The Iraqis, they claimed, were renegade Muslims, whose lives
and property were forfeit to the Ikhwan. Ibn Sa'ud was a model of a
common sense and prudence. If he encouraged fanaticism, it was to use it
as an instrument to achieve his object; he was never himself a fanatic. To a
wild and unruly people, however prudence and common sense offered few
attractions. 77
Britain recognized the superior position of power that they held in the situation due to
their military supremacy and growing financial interest in the state. Ibn Sa'ud also shared
this knowledge, which was perhaps what fuelled his compliance with British officers
whenever needed. However, the Ikhwan were unable to see the pragmatism of the
situation because the religious sentiment that motivated them was not to be challenged on
the basis of logistical alliances. As far as the Ikhwan were concerned, the British
represented the infidels that Islam had been at war with for centuries, and consequently it
was their religious duty to fight them. It is this ideology that also motivated the Ikhwan in
their actions against the Iraqis and drove them to questioning ibn Sa'ud’s rule because he
was foregoing the principles the Saudi state was based upon:
The Ikhwan were intoxicated with their own strength, and claimed that it
was their fighting power, which made ibn Sa'ud great. By challenging the
king on the question of war with Iraq, the Ikhwan were able to claim
religious sentiments on their side. The Iraqis were not Wahhabis and were
therefore renegade Muslims, against whom holy war was a duty. It was
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ibn Sa'ud who was guilty of religious laxity in being unwilling to engage
in hostilities against the enemies of God. 78
By framing the situation from a religious standpoint, the Ikhwan were unwilling to
concede ground on such matters. Moreover, the fact that the Ikhwan had been successful
in their campaigns thus far was further incentive for them to continue fighting because in
their eyes, victory was a result of having a morally superior reason to go to war. The
main Ikhwan leaders, Faisal al-Dawish and Sultan bin Bajad, were aware of this
argument and saw no reason to compromise their actions, especially with a non-Muslim
power:
The issue was complicated by the fact that the movement was conducted
under a religious banner; claiming to be genuine defenders of the faith and
accused ibn Sa'ud of ignoring the true religion and collaborating with the
infidel British for the sake of his vested interests. 79
Amongst other grievances that the Ikhwan listed against ibn Sa'ud was his use of modern
technology, borders delineated towards British forts so as to protect them, and his
consistent efforts to disrupt the expansion of holy warfare. 80 Ibn Sa'ud gradually
reorganized that he needed to create a military force of his own, since he could no longer
rely on the Ikhwan, and began campaigning amongst other tribal leaders in his kingdom.
The rhetoric communicated to these leaders was two-fold: first, he claimed that the
Ikhwan were seeking an independent state that prescribed religious conformity, and that
this move would require these leaders to lose all control over their tribes. Second, he
insisted that the superior technology of the British meant it was extremely implausible
that the Ikhwan would continue to proceed unchecked in their raiding ventures; instead, it
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was simply a matter of time before the British intervened more aggressively. The fact that
the Ikhwan raids in Kuwait had already engaged an RAF response, and the Ikhwan were
threatening other realms that had treaties with the British, meant the Ikhwan were
provoking the inevitable and ibn Sa'ud implored these leaders to see reason. 81 Ibn Sa'ud
played upon the traditional issues that divided nomads and settled people when recruiting
these leaders to his cause with the nobility from the oases “keen to protect its interests
against the rebel nomadic population.” 82
After raising an army fully capable and equipped to fight against the Ikhwan, the
two sides met in the Battle of Sabilla in March of 1929. The outcome was unanimous in
favor of ibn Sa'ud because of his willingness to embrace modern technology. The
Ikhwan, with swords and sticks, came up against a Saudi force with machine guns and
cavalry. The victory for ibn Sa'ud was essential in consolidating his rule once and for all
and changed the nature in which religion and politics interacted. In the aftermath of the
battle an important development was the “rejection of the claim of the Ikhwan that they
could proclaim Holy War, without the permission of the Imam, that is to say ibn Sa'ud.” 83
The modern union that ibn Sa'ud had formed between religion and politics left him in an
unparalleled position of power in the new Saudi state. This is not to say that Wahhabism
moved towards a less conservative position, but rather that it was now realigned with
contemporary political practices managed by the state apparatus. The Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, as it exists today, still practices Wahhabi Hanbali Sunni Islam, and in many ways

81

Wilson, Peter W., and Douglas Graham. Saudi Arabia: The Coming Storm. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe,
1994, 45.
82
Wahbah., 302.
83
McLoughlin., 89.

Tracing Islamic Extremist Ideologies | 127

this form of Islam has been unchanged since the eighteenth century. 84 Yet, ibn Sa'ud
recognized the importance of the institutionalization of Wahhabism in order for the
country to grow socially, economically and politically. As the political landscape
continued to change, it was important for ibn Sa'ud to reconcile Islam with broader
standards of the time. As a result, the relationship between ibn Sa'ud and the Ikhwan
demonstrate another crucial moment in the history of Islam and jihad where a particular
context defined the medium through which the tension between religious ideology and
political realities was expressed. Thus, the history of Saudi Arabia illustrates the way in
which even internal to a region and a political ideology the fortunes of affiliation to
doctrine and belief change based on various historical conjunctures.

84

This is not to say that the tension between religious and political institutes no longer exists today and in
fact, in some instances it has been exacerbated. A common criticism of the Kingdom is that it does little to
prevent interpretations of Islam that encourage the use of violence against outsiders. The Interpretations of
the Meanings of the Noble Qur’an in the English Language by M. Khan and T. Hilali highlight such an
instance. Within this text the authors interpolate the words “the Jews” and “the Christians” when the
Qur’an refers to the infidels, based upon a specific historical moment between the Prophet Muhammad and
his initial followers. The impact of such action takes away from the contemplative nature that many
Islamists, including Abd al-Wahhab, state that Muslims should follow when reading the Qur’an. The
actions of the authors, which was certified by the religious institutes and distributed around the world,
attributes fixed meanings to the Qur’an and consequently explains the perpetual state of war certain
Muslims feel their lives require. This example highlights the tension that exists contemporarily between the
religious institutes and their political counterparts. While ibn Sa'ud constrained the activities of a
particularly zealous sect, his actions do not detract from the overall influence that Islam has had in the
formation of a Saudi Arabian identity. Therefore, it will always be difficult to restrict religious intensity in
Saudi Arabia and why a complete overhaul of governance is unrealistic because of its inextricable link to
the country’s origins.
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Epilogue: Identificatory Politics

T

he events of September 11th, 2001, incited a global conversation about the
relationship between religious devotion and violence. This led to new

identificatory politics that assumed linkages between Islam as a belief system and the
violent actions of the September 11th perpetrators. The all-too easy collapse of Muslim
into terrorist has escalated with the rise of Da’esh and a new global concern with the
relationship between Islam and violence. I remember exactly where I was when 9/11 took
place; I had just returned home from a football match in Bahrain, and it was a week
before my 8th birthday. My parents were sitting on the couch, my brother was standing in
the doorway, and everyone’s eyes were fixated on the TV. Yet, all I make out was a big
plume of smoke. I often talk to my parents about that day and ask them if they ever could
have imagined the implications of that moment. Their response suggests they feared a
backlash, as my dad had been involved in the first Gulf War, and had a sense of the
political dynamics of the region. But neither had ever comes close to conceptualizing the
chaos that has now engulfed the region for over a decade. This region, my home, played a
significant role in shaping my own identity. As an Indian that had never lived in India, a
Hindu that did not speak Hindi and a Catholic that had never been confirmed, my identity
was in flux, and yet also inextricably linked to the culture and community that had
become my home. For 18 years, until I came to America to continue my education, this
culture and community was a mixture of expatriate and local Arab influences. Yet,
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questions concerning a global dialogue about Islam and violence never permeated my
thought process on a regular basis because I was still young and more importantly I was
still at home, in the Arab world. I choose to call it the Arab World because it is a gross
oversight to regard the entire Middle East as a composite of Muslims; this is a simple and
common oversimplification of the history of the region. This oversight is partially what I
have tried to address in my research, highlighting the shifting narratives and historical
processes that have led to the present day emergence of nation-states and their uneasy
relationship with Islam.
As a result of these events it has become easy to scapegoat Islam, and Muslims
find themselves in similar positions as other marginalized groups, such as the LGBTQ
community, African-Americans or other immigrants. For each of these communities it is
easy to blame the entire group when fears and insecurities are consistently propagated by
skewed rhetoric, regardless of the source. However, when such behavior takes place, we
have to ask the question who will bear the brunt of such speech? I look upon this question
with a personal affliction, having spent so many years in Arab and Muslim communities
that raised me to be aware of my surroundings and the people that inhabit them. Islam
now faces increasing criticism and believers have been forced to defend the faith in the
face of every new instance of violence. This constant pressure to defend the religion has
also forced Muslims to choose whether or not to publicly acknowledge their faith. This
choice plagues believers and turns faith into an issue of identificatory politics.
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Identity Conflicts in America
Having attended college in California, my interpretation of this conflict certainly
has an America-centric perspective to it, but I believe this perspective captures key
dynamics that can be used as a microcosm of a more global perspective. While I have my
own opinions of what Islam consists of and what it means to people, Muslim-Americans
have to wrestle with the narrative propagated by mass media and align it with their own
beliefs. There is a large number of personal blogs that pertain to the identity conflict, and
they all make a point of first acknowledging that the writers were Muslim and
Americans, or Muslim-Americans. The need to dispel any notion that one part of the
hyphen constitutes a greater proportion of their identity than another was immediate.
Moreover, these blogs assumed that both components of the hyphenated identity could be
reconciled in today’s world. This assertion emerged as the blogs addressed several subtopics that have impacted the emergence of a narrative that defends this composite
identity. This is especially the case as blog writers discuss the difference between the
Islam practiced by radical groups and propagated by conservative politicians and
activists, and what they truly believe the religion represents. Or when they confront rising
Islamophobia and its role in the immigration debate.
With the USA in the midst of an election season, many of these rhetorical
messages have embodied a larger degree of polarization that has amplified attitudes, both
positive and negative, towards the Muslim community. Many Muslims have directed
their outcry towards politicians who have used their public platform to advance popular
misconceptions about the religion. As one blogger stated, “In the 1st debate, Rick
Santorum spoke at great length about Islam not really being a religion thereby excluding
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it from the same legal protections as other religions. To hear him speak about Sunnis,
Shia, Jihad, and the Caliphate you’d think he were an expert on Islamic Studies. Except
all his “facts” were wrong.” 1 The disturbing reality that such blatant oversights regarding
Islam now have a platform that reaches many people is certainly a cause for concern and
contributes to making boundaries that currently divide global communities. For many
Muslims, statements such as the one made by Santorum mean that on a daily basis they
have to actively clarify what Islam really is to friends, neighbors, and colleagues or else
face increased marginalization and suspicion. In this volatile contemporary world,
religious beliefs do not hold the same private sanctuary in a person’s life as they did in
years past; to some extent critics argue that when those private beliefs disrupt the public
order than rights to religious devotion are forfeited. Yet, this argument overlooks the fact
that Islam was never monolithic and contains an inherent conversation concerning the
relationship between religion, politics, and violence, has drastically shifted in its sense of
communal welfare from its inception in the late antique world to its current realization
across the globe.
However, when the religion carries years of historical developments and nuances,
overlooking these differences accentuates binary thinking, xenophobia, and contributes to
antagonistic frameworks of in-groups and out-groups. The same blogger acknowledged
the need to differentiate the way in which vocabulary is used to describe violent actors
and alienate potential allies stating, “The phrase ‘Radical Islam’ is insulting to potential
Muslim allies. When you insult your allies, you help recruit for ISIS. The war they claim
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to want to win is prolonged every time they put their low information base above the
safety and security of all Americans and our troops overseas.” 2 The complexity of the
situation places the Muslim community in an extremely difficult position, with those who
want to help unable to consistently do so for fear of being typecast as the same people
conducting crimes against humanity. When a scenario like this one arises, how can a
cohesive effort emerge that combats the actors elements that have resorted to such brutal
means under the banner of Islam. Suggestions that groups like al-Qa’eda and Da’esh arise
inherently from Islam, or can be explained solely through religious factors, insults both
the inherent diversity of that religion’s history, as well as the socio-economic and
political developments in the present that shape the evolution and the rhetoric of these
groups.
The intersection between politics and religion is certainly not a new phenomenon;
yet, the added degree of polarization that has accompanied it in recent decades contains
more worrying implications. Recognizing that people in powerful positions have the
ability to profoundly shape public opinion through new media platforms and do so across
the political spectrum heightens the problem. Rick Santorum is not the only individual
who has raised anti-Muslim sentiments, Michelle Bachmann, Allen West, John Bennett,
Bill Maher and of course Donald Trump have all “made discriminatory and Islamophobic
statements regarding Muslims in recent years.” 3 Elected representatives, candidates, and
popular media figures freely express discriminatory sentiments. In past months many
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Americans have debated whether these sentiments merely reflect public opinion, or are
part of a new media environment that builds on inflammatory statements. Preying on a
tense environment of fear allows for great political gains to be made, doing so, however,
by questioning the religious viability of Islam “fuels the cycle of hate and ignorance” and
undermines the very principles that this country was founded upon. 4 This is not a
criticism leveled only at America, as anti-migrant points of view have become a feature
of public discourse across Europe as well, and contributed to the revitalization of fascist
parties. The greater concern is how such standpoints rest in personal opinion rather than
those grounded in historical awareness. The propagation of these ideologies leads not
only to a society of greater partisanship, but also endangers the lives of everyday
Muslims who seek to reside in harmony with the country they call home.
With such polarized public opinions becoming more of a norm, the Brookings
Institute conducted a survey with regards to the American public's attitude towards
Muslims and Islam. The conclusions drawn from the survey are of particular note, as
many Americans clearly differentiated between Muslim people and the religion of Islam,
viewing the latter more unfavorably than the former. 5 The ability of politicians to take a
commanding role in defining the direction the dialogue takes highlights the importance of
the individual spokesperson in this national narrative concerning Islam. It is easy for
people to hate an abstract concept, yet, meeting an individual and recognizing that they
may share similar goals and aspirations changes the dynamic of that relationship.
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Ultimately, this phenomenon (acceptance of the individual and discrimination against the
religion) becomes hard to ignore when confronted with anti-immigration policies that
also specifically target Muslims and contribute to rising Islamophobia. Yet, creating an
environment that facilitates mutual understanding and sympathy on an individual level
becomes difficult, especially for the Muslim community as one blogger stated, “being
Muslim in America means being identified by only one aspect of my identity. It means
being told exactly what it means to be Muslim in America and having very little control
over the narrative.” 6 Many critics of immigration believe that the principles of Islam
cannot be reconciled with democratic institutions and principles; yet, this cannot be true
because, as the same blogger stated, “American Muslims encompass a number of sects,
races and viewpoints on domestic and international policies, presidential candidates, and
everything else.” 7 As such, American Muslims embody the deliberative and diverse
aspects of the country that center on the freedom to embrace different beliefs and ways of
being. However, as a result of 9/11 and the chaos that has ensued, freedom to create one’s
own identity has been denied to American Muslims, leaving them instead in a posture of
defense.

Final Thoughts
As the title of this thesis suggests, there is an increased focus on the role of jihad
in Islam, yet, the historical examples provided in the chapters do not always explicitly
mention jihad. A historical investigation of the relationship between Islam and
6
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justifications for warfare requires a constant comparison between religious ideology and
its context. At times historical processes led to the propagation of aggressive elements of
jihad and Islam and at other times either minimizing these elements or using rhetoric to
sustain political positions without outright warfare. As this thesis explores only a few
contexts, it can also only offer partial assessments of the historical evolution of jihad as
both a mode of warfare and a political ideology. Yet this research is a singularly
important, as the prevailing theme in the post 9/11 world ignores history and denies the
importance of comparative theories concerning the relationship between jihad and
religious belief. As a result, oftentimes Muslim organizations, such as the All Dulles Area
Muslim Society, have had to publicly state their position on issues involving Islamic
groups or risk being an advocate for extremist actions, as a spokesman stated “we feel
responsible, as citizens, as Muslim, to defend our faith from these evildoers. At ADAMS
this also means ensuring that children learn to become both good Muslims and good
Americans.” 8 I always find it interesting when an entire group of people is held
accountable for the actions of the minority. The events of 9/11 have not only
reinvigorated the rhetoric of the Crusades, the binary of conflict between Islam and the
West but also reflect an inherent imbalance in this rhetoric. The fact that mass media
often postulates Islam versus the West, rather than Islam versus Christianity, and does not
take into account the complex relationship between religion and violence within the
history of Christianity highlights this imbalance. As a result, few, if any, blame
Christianity for the Holocaust, but rather a particular political figure, Hitler, and the
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movement he mobilized, Nazism. Yet, Islam is consistently blamed for the actions of
Osama bin Laden, al-Qa’eda and Da’esh.
A crucial point of contention that arises from the current predicament that
Muslims find themselves in concerning defensive postures revolves around the different
set of standards that their religion is subjected to. Criticisms of the religion as a whole
stem from its inherent complexity and the multiple interpretations that emerge as a result.
This is a concept that I wished to highlight throughout my thesis, the fact that in different
times, different people propagated a particular form of Islam to achieve certain goals.
Again, this is not a new or radical perception of either religion or history, but critics of
Islam tend to ignore both. Moreover, they conflate misinformation for truth for example
by arguing that “there is no single authoritative interpretation of Islam - unlike Catholics,
Muslims have no pope who can settle doctrinal debates.” 9 The idea that a complete
centralization of authority in Islam would solve all the issues associated with the religion
is another gross oversight, and is an entirely invalid comparison to make. The internal
splintering within the Christian religion is not unlike the various forms of Islam;
therefore, the premise that a central authority for the majoritarian branch of the religion is
the reason for its perceived unity undermines the historical developments in the religion
itself. Critics further contend that the form of Islam practiced by extremist groups
“derived from coherent and even learned interpretations of Islam,” a statement that on its
own is not entirely false. 10 While this idea may be true, it should also be accompanied by
the fact that religions based on scripture always contend with questions of interpretation.
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This is true for each monotheistic tradition, where for Judaism, Christianity, and Islam
debates concerning how religious should be interpreted are a core part of the historical
evaluation of each faith. These groups have, in many cases, taken their direction from
certain aspects of Islamic theology but if the core of the religion is the Qur’an and the
hadiths, then as stated throughout this thesis, a true understanding requires intensive
examinations between all texts. When taken in isolation, anyone would be able to
communicate that Islam represents a particular point of view, but this argument
oversimplifies the religion. Therefore, the burden rests in how one interprets the texts and
their connections to each other. The gravity of the implications of this problem is
highlighted by the fact that scholars have attempted to tackle this topic over many years
and have yet to come to a definitive conclusion. The various interpretations that could
exist also prompt critics to believe that Islamic groups have “as much legitimacy as
anyone else,” yet, this becomes an issue for the individual as opposed to the religion
itself. 11 Within any religion, one could argue that there are elements of aggressive and
violent actions especially that of the book, but the religious spectrum that emerges rest in
individual interpretation.
The cycle that begins from such criticisms of Islam perpetuates the divide
between different communities. Having lived a significant proportion of my life in the
Middle East, I have benefitted from the generosity of the religion and its people.
Therefore, I often think about how I can help others see and believe that Islam does not
inherently advocate extremist behavior, such as that of Da’esh, as much as another
religion does. The study from the Brookings Institution found that “demographically,
11
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younger people and those with higher education have slightly more favorable views of
Islam and Muslims.” 12 It is not specifically that having an education means you
understand the historical diversity of Islam but rather it encourages an individual to think
critically about the issues at hand, providing a different dimension to the conversation.
Consequently, generating a personal connection to the religion in any form increases
“favorable views of Muslims; this holds across the political spectrum.” 13 Such
conclusions provide me with optimism in the sense that I hope those who read this thesis
will also critically question their beliefs and endeavor to further understand Islam. I have
never been particularly religious, yet, my mother, a conservative Catholic, always argues
that religion provides a sense of peace and sanctuary to many people and that is its
ultimate beauty. I cannot fault such an argument because as an institution, religions have
emerged parallel with the emergence of settled human life and cooperative communal
system. Therefore, I would state that in holding different religions to different standards
we place a different value on the lives of those who practice different religions. If this is
the case, then humanity has undermined itself to a much larger degree and forgotten that
“identity is a relationship and people define themselves in part as a function of how
others view them.” 14 With this in mind it is important to recognize differences between
communities and individuals without labelling them and to allow this difference to enrich
patterns of global connectivity rather than to set standards which demonize them.
A recent talk by Michael Sells, the John Henry Barrows Professor of Islamic
History and Literature at the University of Chicago and a specialist in Qur’anic scripture,
12
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stated that the way in which the academic community can combat Islamophobia and
groups such as Da’esh is to communicate the complexities of the religion in a clear and
cohesive way. However, this task becomes inherently more difficult when a majority of
the population in America has no background in Islamic history. Therefore, Sells
suggested that more than delving into the depths of the religion, one should speak about
Islam and religion as a whole with “due respect.” 15 In order to do so, Sells stated that
there were three criteria one must adhere to: sensitivity, no oversimplification of events
and people, and, most importantly, no moral judgment. 16 Presenting Islam in line with
these principles opens a line of communication between individuals that potentially casts
aside previously held prejudices. Still, it is difficult to insert a respectful approach to the
religion if participants in a conversation assume from the onset an antagonistic
relationship to Islam. It is thus my conviction that students and scholars have a moral
obligation to circulate new knowledge and interpretations of the past, so as to work
against the biases that have developed, and thus perhaps challenge the barriers the plague
religion and the global community in the 21st century.
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